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INTERNING THE “NON-ALIEN” OTHER: 
THE ILLUSORY PROTECTIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP 
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history.  As a legal prece-
dent is it now recognized as having very limited application.  As historical precedent it 
stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our in-
stitutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees.  It stands as a cau-
tion that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must 
not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability.  It 
stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institu-
tions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to protect all citizens from 
the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused. 
Judge Marilyn Hall Patel, Korematsu v. United States (1984)1 
 
With these words, Federal District Judge Marilyn Patel granted Fred Kore-
matsu’s petition for a writ of coram nobis and, forty years after the fact, vacated 
his conviction for refusing to comply with the evacuation order under which all 
persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast, two-thirds of them U.S.-born 
citizens, were interned during World War II.  Neither Judge Patel nor the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals that subsequently vacated Gordon Hirabayashi’s con-
viction for violating the curfew and evacuation orders2 had the power to over-
turn the precedents set by the Supreme Court in 1943 and 1944, when it af-
firmed the convictions and thus legitimated the mass incarceration of a people 
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 1. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  On the coram nobis 
cases, see generally JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 
CASES (Peter Irons ed., 1989). 
 2. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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based on national origin.3  However, as Judge Patel noted, by the mid-1980s le-
gal scholars and even Supreme Court justices had described the original Kore-
matsu decision as “an anachronism,”4 and U.S. government lawyers in the co-
ram nobis case had agreed with the findings of the Commission on Wartime 
Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), established by Congress in 
1980, that “the decision in Korematsu lies overruled in the court of history.”5 
Nonetheless, as law professor Fred Yen warned in 1998, “[u]nfortunately, 
proclamations of Korematsu’s permanent discrediting are premature.”6  As we 
have seen since the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade 
Center, Muslims and those of Arab or Middle Eastern descent have been de-
tained and deported by the thousands7 and the mass internment of civilians in 
the United States has resurfaced as a viable option in the “war on terror.”8  In 
addition, at least two U.S.-born citizens, Yaser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, 
also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, have been held without charge for nearly 
three years on the government’s unsupported assertion that they are “enemy 
combatants.”9  While the U.S. government has been understandably reluctant to 
invoke the Supreme Court’s holdings in the Japanese American internment 
cases, these are the precedents on which it must ultimately rely to justify hold-
ing Hamdi and Padilla indefinitely in what are essentially one-person intern-
ment camps.10 
 
 3. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); 
and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  For an excellent analysis and critique of these 
cases, see Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L. J. 489 (1945); for 
their history, see generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1993).  Minoru Yasui’s petition for a writ of coram nobis was dis-
missed by Federal District Judge Belloni in Portland; Yasui died before his appeal could be heard by 
the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court refused to review the case.  See IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED, 
supra note 1, at 27-30. 
 4. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. at 1420. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Alfred C. Yen, Praising with Faint Damnation—The Troubling Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 
B.C. L. REV. / 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. (joint issue) 1, 2 (1998). On the “dark side” of the coram no-
bis opinions, particularly how they serve to absolve the judiciary of any responsibility for the intern-
ment, see generally Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 
933 (2004). 
 7. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); NANCY CHANG, SILENCING POLITICAL DISSENT: 
HOW POST-SEPTEMBER 11 ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES (2002). 
 8. For example, Representative Howard Coble, R-N.C., chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, said, in response to a radio program 
caller’s suggestion that Arabs be interned, that the World War II camps were established to “protect” 
Japanese Americans, adding that some Japanese Americans were “probably intent on doing harm to us 
just as some of these Arab-Americans are probably intent on doing harm to us.”  Associated Press, 
N.C. Rep.: WWII Internment Camps Were Meant to Help, (Feb. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,77677,00.html.  See also Jonathan Turley, Camp for Citizens: 
Ashcroft’s Hellish Vision; Attorney general shows himself as a menace to liberty, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2002, at B11. 
 9. See infra notes 188-205, 2232-28 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Chris K. Iijima, Shooting Justice Jackson’s “Loaded Weapon” at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Ab-
dication at the Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 119, n.50 (2004) 
(noting that in dismissing Hamdi’s appeal, “the Fourth Circuit failed to cite Korematsu, a clearly analo-
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As Judge Patel’s opinion illustrates, in recent decades the Japanese Ameri-
can internment has been widely viewed as an unfortunate—if understandable—
“mistake” made in times of war, an aberration from the norm of constitutional 
protection that has been acknowledged as unjust and that was remedied by the 
official apology and compensation provided survivors under the Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988.11  However, if recent actions taken in the name of fighting terrorism 
are considered within the broader context of the United States’ history of in-
terning those deemed “Other,” we must recognize that this “mistake” has not 
been remedied in any structural sense.  Instead, it takes its place in a long and 
on-going history of the use of internment as a tool for controlling the Other. 
The Japanese American experience is but one example of how those 
deemed Other by virtue of race, ethnicity, national origin or political ideology 
have been and continue to be conflated with those who are Other by virtue of 
alienage.  This is not surprising, given that until the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, U.S. citizenship was restricted to those of exclusively 
European descent.  After that, citizenship was extended to most persons born in 
the territory regardless of race,12 but racial restrictions on naturalized citizenship 
were not entirely eliminated until 1952.13  As a result, we live with the contradic-
tion between the presumption that real Americans are “white” and the fact that 
many people of color are U.S. citizens. 
Discussions of both the World War II internment and the post-September 
11 detentions often focus on the citizen-alien distinction, implying, at least im-
plicitly, that the real danger in allowing aliens to be denied due process of law is 
the likelihood that citizens, too, will be similarly mistreated.14  While this argu-
ment may have its tactical uses—it is, after all, an appeal to the immediate self-
interest of those presumed to have the most influence over government pol-
icy—it reinforces the notion that the citizenry as a whole is generally protected 
 
gous case, perhaps because of Korematsu’s troubled legacy and reputation. . . . Completely undiscussed 
was the fact that Hamdi’s constitutional protections were suspended on the very grounds that the in-
ternment had been justified: military security.”(citations omitted)). 
 11. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989 
(2000).  See generally LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHTING A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE 
PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988 (1993). 
 12. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.  In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Su-
preme Court held that a child born to Chinese parents was a citizen, confirming that citizenship result-
ing from birth in the territory was not restricted by race.  However, in Elk v. Wilkins, the Court held 
that American Indians did not acquire birthright citizenship because they were not “subject to the ju-
risdiction” of the United States.  112 U.S. 94, 95 (1884). 
 13. The Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed by the Act of January 19, 1795, which re-
enacted most of its provisions, including its racial restrictions), limited naturalized citizenship to “free 
white persons.”  In 1870 this was amended to include persons of “African nativity or descent,” Act of 
July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, but most Asians remained barred from naturalized citizenship 
until the 1930s.  Japanese could not naturalize until passage of the Immigration and Nationality 
(McCarran-Walter) Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).  On the history of these racial prerequisites to citi-
zenship, see generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996). 
 14. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 7 (making this point as well as a broader argument 
based on law and morality for respecting the fundamental rights of all persons). 
10_SAITO_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:36 AM 
176 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:173 
by governmental action taken in the name of national security.  In other words, 
it encourages us to believe that when the U.S. government takes action to pro-
tect “us,” the “we” at issue is comprised of all Americans.  This, in turn, makes 
it easier to disregard the extent to which the government exercises jurisdiction 
over large groups of people deemed Other, both citizens and noncitizens, with-
out extending to them the protections guaranteed by law. 
The fundamental human rights embodied in both the Constitution and in in-
ternational law apply to all persons; by framing the discussion in terms of dis-
tinctions between the rights of citizens and aliens, we lose sight of the reality 
that, throughout U.S. history, those who have been deemed Other, regardless of 
citizenship, have routinely been denied due process of law and have frequently 
been subjected to mass internment.  During World War II the evacuation or-
ders were directed at all persons of Japanese ancestry, “alien and non-alien.”15  
The latter term, of course, referred to the Nisei, or second generation, U.S. citi-
zens by birth.  The history of internments in the United States sheds light on the 
reality that many who hold U.S. citizenship are best described as “non-aliens,” 
unprotected by any other sovereign yet still considered foreign” and easily 
transformed into “the enemy.”16  
II 
ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY, ALIEN AND NON-ALIEN 
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a con-
centration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning 
his loyalty. . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice . . . merely confuses 
the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
him or his race.  He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire. 
United States v. Korematsu (1944)17 
By the time Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941, Japanese 
American communities both on the mainland and in Hawai`i had long been un-
der surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Office of 
Naval Intelligence (ONI).  Together with the State Department, these agencies 
concluded that the Japanese government was much more likely to use “Occi-
dentals” than “its own people” as operatives.18  Indeed, according to a report 
 
 15. See, e.g., Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57, 7 Fed. Reg. 3725 (May 19, 1942).  This concept is also 
illustrated by Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt’s Public Proclamation No. 3 of March 24, 1942, which imposed a 
curfew on “all enemy aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry” within designated military areas.  7 
Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942). 
 16. On “foreign-ness” as integral to the racial identity of Asian Americans, see generally Neil Go-
tanda, Asian American Rights and the “Miss Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 1087 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992); Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” and Asian American 
Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN 
AM. PAC. ISLANDS L.J. 1 (1996); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreign-
ness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 (1997). 
 17. United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
 18. The terminology is from a memo from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General 
Francis Biddle on Feb. 2, 1942.  As was explained in a Nov. 1941 report prepared by Curtis B. Munson, 
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prepared for the White House by Curtis B. Munson, an intelligence analyst who 
claimed to be working for the State Department, the Nisei displayed “an almost 
pathetic eagerness to be Americans.”19  Many volunteered for military service, 
only to be turned away, classified by the War Department as “enemy aliens” in-
eligible to service, and many who were in the military were discharged.20 
Despite their conclusion that the Japanese American community posed no 
threat to the national security, the FBI and ONI had compiled a list of ap-
proximately 1350 persons to be detained in the event of war with Japan, of 
whom fewer than 200 were considered to be of any actual danger.  Most were 
community leaders, business owners, or teachers, and within three days of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, virtually everyone on the list was in custody.  Eventu-
ally they were given individualized hearings and either released or detained for 
the duration of the war.  Having thus dealt with any actual security issues, the 
FBI, ONI, Attorney General Francis Biddle, and Curtis Munson had all con-
cluded that there was “no Japanese ‘problem’ on the West Coast” and advised 
against mass internment.21 
There was considerable evidence of German sabotage but no mass intern-
ment of German Americans.22  The difference, according to Lieutenant General 
John L. DeWitt, in charge of the U.S. Western Defense Command, was that 
“[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third genera-
tion Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, 
have become ‘Americanized,’ the racial strains are undiluted.”23  Testifying be-
fore a Congressional committee, DeWitt was asked about the contrasting 
treatment afforded Germans and Italians.  He responded, “You needn’t worry 
about the Italians at all except in certain cases.  Also, the same for Germans ex-
cept in individual cases.  But we must worry about the Japanese all the time un-
til he is wiped off the map.”24 
 
a State Department specialist commissioned by President Roosevelt to assess the loyalty of the Japa-
nese American community on the West Coast, “The Japanese are hampered as saboteurs because of 
their easily recognized physical appearance.  It will be hard for them to get near anything to blow it up 
[because they have] no entrée to plants or intricate machinery. . . . There is far more danger from 
[whites] than from Japanese.”  A copy of “The Munson Report” is included in U.S. Congress, Hearings 
Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946). 
 19. MICHI NISHIMURA WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS 41 (1976). 
 20. See U.S. CONGRESS, COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF 
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION 
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS 186-88 (1982) [hereinafter CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED]; 
ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, MARGARET CHON, CAROL L. IZUMI, JERRY KANG & FRANK H. WU, RACE, 
RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 224 (2001). 
 21. See CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 54-55.  A similar conclusion was 
reached by General Delos Emmons, U.S. military governor of Hawai`i, who subsequently blocked the 
mass incarceration of persons of Japanese descent in Hawai`i, in large part because they were vital to 
the economy.  See WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 46-50, 86-89. 
 22. CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 283-93. 
 23. Id. at 66. 
 24. Id. 
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Despite the fact that the military and civilian intelligence services had con-
cluded that the Japanese American community posed no threat to the national 
security—indeed, even by war’s end there was not a single confirmed incident 
of espionage or sabotage involving Japanese Americans25 on February 19, 
1942 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order (EO) 9066, 
authorizing the immediate evacuation of Japanese Americans from the “militar-
ily sensitive” coastal areas of California, Oregon and Washington states and 
rendering the remainder of their rights “subject to military edict.”26  Shortly 
thereafter, DeWitt imposed a curfew and travel restrictions on German and 
Italian aliens and all Japanese Americans.  He then ordered the evacuation of 
“all persons of Japanese descent, alien and non-alien” on the West Coast.  Un-
der this order, even babies in orphanages were deemed threats to national secu-
rity.27 
Nearly 120,000 men and women, children, and old people were thus forced 
to abandon their homes, farms and businesses; store or sell their possessions on 
a few days’ notice; and report for removal with only what they could carry.  
They were tagged with numbers and taken under armed guard to “assembly 
centers,” hastily converted holding facilities such as the racetracks at Tanforan 
and Santa Anita, California, where they were housed in horse stalls or make-
shift barracks.28  From there they were shipped off through the desert, many on 
trains with darkened windows, to ten concentration camps, euphemistically des-
ignated “relocation centers,” in the interior,29 where they were held for the du-
 
 25. See TETSUDEN KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN 
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR II 39 (1992); ROGER DANIELS, THE DECISION TO RELOCATE 
THE JAPANESE AMERICANS 6 (1975). 
 26. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3, at 63. 
 27. In early April 1942 a priest running an orphanage in Los Angeles inquired of Lt. Col. Karl 
Bendetsen, the officer in charge of rounding up Japanese Americans, whether it was necessary to turn 
over children of less than one-quarter Japanese “blood” for internment.  Bendetsen replied that he was 
“determined that if they have one drop of Japanese blood in them, they must go to a camp.”  See 
WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 77, 291 n.1.  Ironically, Bendetsen, who would be promoted to Under Secre-
tary of the Army, had gone to great lengths to conceal that he was Jewish.  See KLANCY CLARK DE 
NEVERS, THE COLONEL AND THE PACIFIST: KARL BENDETSEN, PERRY SAITO, AND THE 
INCARCERATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II 53, 206-07, 268, 286, 304-06 
(2004). 
 28. For a vivid description of life in the “assembly centers,” see Violet de Christoforo’s Tule Lake, 
in JOHN TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
DETENTION CAMPS 125-26 (1984) (noting the unbearable smell of manure in the summer heat and the 
food poisoning suffered by internees). 
 29. Although the Congressional Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians 
(CWRIC) preferred the term “relocation center” because “concentration camp” was considered “con-
troversial,” see CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 27n, those implementing the 
internment were clear that these were concentration camps—a term not to be confused with extermina-
tion camps.  Dillon S. Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) and thus directly re-
sponsible for the camps, stated that the Moab, Utah facility was “nothing more than a concentration 
camp.”  RICHARD DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS: DILLON S. MYER AND 
AMERICAN RACISM 62 (1987).  Tom Clark, who served as the Justice Department’s liaison to the 
WRA during the war, said upon his retirement from the Supreme Court in 1967, “We picked the [Japa-
nese Americans] up and put them in concentration camps.  That’s the truth of it.” WEGLYN, supra note 
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ration of the war.  Many were separated from their families and all subjected to 
constant uncertainty about their future.  Life was harsh as internees endured 
the desert heat, cold, and dust storms in hastily constructed wooden barracks 
with no privacy, poor food, inadequate health care, and very little in the way of 
meaningful activity, surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards.30 
By the end of 1942, Secretary of War Henry Stimson had decided, over 
DeWitt’s objection, to establish a segregated all-Nisei combat unit composed of 
volunteers determined to be loyal.31  This led to the development of a “loyalty 
review program” to which all internees over the age of seventeen, men and 
women, U.S. and Japanese citizens, were subjected.32  Thus, after having been 
arbitrarily incarcerated for eighteen months or two years on the basis of Gen-
eral DeWitt’s assertion that it was impossible to tell the “loyal” from the “dis-
loyal,”33 the determination was made based on a questionnaire about internees’ 
families, language usage, education, organizational affiliations, “American hab-
its,” dress, and customs.34 
Questions 27 and 28 asked, 
Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty 
whenever ordered? 
Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America and faithfully 
defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or domestic forces, and for-
swear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, to any other for-
eign government, power or organization?35 
 
19, at 214.  And on November 21, 1944, President Roosevelt openly stated that American citizens of 
Japanese descent were being “kept locked up in concentration camps.”  Id. at 217. 
 30. See generally, TATEISHI, AND JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 28.  After visiting the camps in 
which Japanese Latin Americans were being held, Albert Clattenberg of the State Department warned 
that the conditions were far worse than those in which U.S. prisoners in European P.O.W. camps were 
being held and worried that they would subject U.S. citizens to “ruthless retaliation.”  See Natsu Taylor 
Saito, Justice Held Hostage: U.S. Disregard for International Law in the World War II Internment of 
Japanese Peruvians—A Case Study, 40  B.C. L. REV  9 /19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 291 (joint issue 
1998). 
 31. CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 13.  This led to the formation of the 
442nd Regimental Combat Team, per capita the most decorated American unit in World War II.  It was 
awarded seven Presidential Unit Citations in barely three years. Its men garnered more than 18,000 
decorations during the same period and recorded 9,486 causalities, including more than 600 killed in 
action.  The official unit history, entitled The Story of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, was pre-
pared under Army auspices immediately after the war but never published.  It is lodged in the National 
Archives in Washington, D.C. (Record Group 407, Stack Area 207).  See generally CHESTER TANAKA, 
GO FOR BROKE: A PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 100TH INFANTRY BATTALION 
AND THE 442ND REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM (1982).  On its less celebrated Hawaiian predecessor 
unit, see THOMAS D. MURPHY, AMBASSADORS IN ARMS: THE STORY OF THE 100TH BATTALION 
(1954). 
 32. CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 190-91. 
 33. Id. at 8.  This position received widespread support, as reflected in the report prepared for At-
torney General Biddle by three lawyers which stated, “Since the Occidental eye cannot readily distin-
guish one Japanese resident from another, effective surveillance of the movements of particular Japa-
nese residents suspected of disloyalty is extremely difficult if not practically impossible,” quoted in 
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3 at 54. 
 34. See WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 196-99. 
 35. Id. at 199. 
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These questions, which could only be answered “yes” or “no,” caused tremen-
dous confusion and conflict in the camps.  Many Nisei who had tried to volun-
teer for the military were now unwilling to serve unless their constitutional 
rights were restored.36  The issei, or first generation immigrants, were prohibited 
by the racial restriction from becoming naturalized citizens and, therefore, 
would be effectively rendered stateless by a “yes” answer to Question 28.  Their 
children, in turn, were reluctant to risk family separation by answering differ-
ently from their parents.37  Nonetheless, government authorities separated the 
“loyal” from the “disloyal” on the basis of this questionnaire.  The “disloyal” 
were segregated and sent to the Tule Lake camp; some of those the government 
deemed loyal were given “temporary leave” clearance to take jobs or attend 
schools in the east or Midwest, but only if they could find sponsors and the au-
thorities determined that there would not be “backlash” in those communities.38  
Many were detained until 1945, some longer still.39 
Conditions were especially harsh at Tule Lake, where the 18,000 Japanese 
Americans who had been deemed disloyal or denied leave clearance, as well as 
accompanying family members, were concentrated in facilities built for 15,000.  
When protests—labeled “riots”—erupted over conditions in the camp, its ad-
ministration was turned over to the Army, which declared martial law, engaging 
in midnight raids and imprisoning “troublemakers” in an isolated stockade 
within the camp where “human rights were all but stamped out in order that the 
community might be kept in ignorance of what was occurring within.”40  In re-
sponse Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940, providing for the first 
time a legal mechanism to renounce one’s citizenship during wartime.41  Over 
5,700 Nisei renounced their citizenship, 95 percent of them from Tule Lake.42  
After the war, about 5,400 asked for restoration of U.S. citizenship on the 
ground that their renunciations had been obtained under duress.  In a process 
that took years, federal courts eventually agreed and most regained their citi-
zenship.43 
Four Nisei brought legal challenges to the internment.  Minoru (“Min”) Ya-
sui had been a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army Reserve, rejected when he 
 
 36. See generally ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS IN WORLD WAR II (2001). 
 37. See WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 136-40; YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 20, at 197-98. 
 38. See CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 202-06; WEGLYN, supra note 19, 
at 134-73. 
 39. Most Japanese Americans were allowed to return to the West Coast after January 1945; some 
continued to be held at Tule Lake until March of 1946; and some who the U.S. claimed had renounced 
their U.S. citizenship were held until mid-1947.  See WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 260-65. 
 40. WEGLYN, supra note 19, at 166, 156-73. 
 41. Renunciation Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 405 (1944), amending the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 
Stat. 1137 (1941); see generally Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community 
Among “We the People,” 76 OR. L. REV. 233 (1997). 
 42. YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 20, at 227. 
 43. See, eg., Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1949) (holding renunciations void as a 
result of fear, intimidation and coercion); McGrath v. Abo, 186 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951) (finding a re-
buttable presumption that the renunciations were involuntary). 
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volunteered for active duty immediately after Pearl Harbor.  Yasui turned him-
self in to the police in Portland, Oregon, as soon as criminal penalties for viola-
tion of the Army’s curfew order targeting Japanese Americans took effect on 
March 28, 1942.  An attorney as well as an army officer, Yasui took this action 
to test the order’s constitutionality.44  Convicted of violating the curfew, he was 
sentenced to a year in prison.  The district court also held that Yasui had for-
feited his U.S. citizenship because of a prewar position he held at the Japanese 
consulate in Chicago.  “Although [Judge] Fee acknowledged that Japanese law 
conferred on Yasui the right of election of citizenship at the age of majority, 
and that the record disclosed no such election of Japanese citizenship, he found 
more persuasive ‘the nativity of his parents and the subtle nuances of traditional 
mores engrained in his race by centuries of social discipline.’”45 
On May 16, 1942, rather than reporting for relocation, Gordon Hirabayashi, 
a Quaker and pacifist, turned himself in to the FBI in Seattle46 and was subse-
quently found guilty of violating both the evacuation order and an order impos-
ing a curfew on Japanese Americans.47  He appealed, challenging the constitu-
tionality of both orders.  On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court unanimously 
upheld Hirabayashi’s conviction for violating the curfew, ruling that the curfew 
was a reasonable exercise of Congress’ and the Executive’s power to wage war, 
and that its imposition against only persons of Japanese ancestry did not violate 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.  The Court carefully avoided 
addressing the evacuation, stating that it was unnecessary because Hirabayashi 
had received concurrent sentences on the two convictions.48  Relying on its opin-
ion in Hirabayashi, the Supreme Court simultaneously upheld Min Yasui’s con-
viction, opining that during times of war the judiciary was ill-advised to question 
actions borne of military necessity.  However, after the Solicitor General con-
ceded that the trial court was mistaken on the issue, the Court concluded that 
Yasui had not, in fact, renounced his citizenship.49 
In the meantime, Fred Korematsu attempted to avoid evacuation but was 
soon apprehended by the FBI in Oakland, California.  He was convicted in Sep-
tember 1942, sentenced to five years probation and ordered released on appeal 
bond.50  Then, in “what may be one of the few instances in the history of the 
 
 44. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3, at 81-87. 
 45. Id. at 161 (quoting United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 54 (D. Or. 1942)).  On Yasui’s trial, 
see id. at 136-43, 159-62. 
 46. Id. at 87-93; 154-59.   
 47. United States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Wash. 1942). 
 48. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).  Justice Murphy’s concurrence had originally 
been drafted as a dissent, arguing that judicial acquiescence to the military orders was tantamount to 
sanctioning discrimination on the basis of ancestry.  However, he was convinced by Justice Frankfurter 
that any dissent would amount to “playing into the hands of the enemy.”  IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED, 
supra note 1, at 49. 
 49. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943); see also IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3, at 
222-27. 
 50. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 
3, at 93-99, 153-54. 
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United States of armed revolt by the military against duly constituted judicial 
authority,” he was immediately [re]arrested by military policemen with drawn 
guns and taken first to the Presidio stockade in San Francisco, then to the Tan-
foran assembly center.51 
Korematsu’s appeal, like those of Hirabayashi and Yasui, was certified di-
rectly to the Supreme Court.  Unlike the earlier cases, however, Korematsu’s 
did not involve a curfew violation and directly raised the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the evacuation and the internment.  The Court delayed its decision 
by remanding to the Court of Appeals for a decision on the constitutionality of 
the exclusion order, allowing it to avoid ruling on the merits for more than a 
year.52  In December 1944, with President Roosevelt safely reelected, the jus-
tices upheld Korematsu’s conviction for violating the evacuation order by a vote 
of six to three, again avoiding the question of internment.53  The majority ad-
dressed the charge of racial discrimination with the following mind-boggling 
conflation of race and citizenship: 
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a con-
centration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning 
his loyalty. . . . To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice . . . merely confuses 
the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
him or his race.  He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire.54 
As Lorraine Bannai and Dale Minami point out, “[t]he Supreme Court first de-
nied that there was any connection between race and the exclusion, and then 
accepted the argument that exclusion and, implicitly, incarceration, was necessi-
tated by a race-based affinity Japanese Americans were presumed to have for 
Japan.”55 
Mitsuye Endo’s case was decided at the same time as Korematsu’s.  A 
twenty-two-year-old clerical worker, Endo had filed a habeas corpus petition 
from Tule Lake, where she was incarcerated, straightforwardly challenging the 
government’s authority to incarcerate any citizen absent so much as an explicit 
showing of cause.56  Again, the Supreme Court “avoid[ed] constitutional issues 
which [were] necessarily involved,” to quote the concurrence written by Justice 
Roberts, this time by ordering Endo’s release, not on the merits of her legal ar-
gument, but because the government had conceded the fact of her loyalty.57  
 
 51. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3, at 153-54. 
 52. See YAMAMOTO ET AL, supra note 20, at 139. 
 53. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 
3 at 325-41. 
 54. 323 U.S. at 223.  As Eugene Rostow noted, the majority merely “applie[d] the two findings [of 
Hirabayashi]—that the Japanese are a dangerous lot, and that there was no time to screen them indi-
vidually. . . . There [was] no attempt in the Korematsu case to show a reasonable connection between 
the factual situation and the program adopted to deal with it.”  Rostow, supra note 3, at 508-09. 
 55. Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami, Internment During World War II and Litigations, in 
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 16, at 755, 774; see also Iijima, Shooting, 
supra note 10, at 123-25. 
 56. See IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR, supra note 3, at 99-103, 143-51. 
 57. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 308 (1944) (Roberts, J., concurring); see also IRONS, JUSTICE AT 
WAR, supra note 3, at 307-10, 317-19, 323-25, 341-45. 
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While Endo is often portrayed as a “very substantial and important victory” for 
the internees—to quote the CWRIC—the Court actually avoided addressing, 
and thereby implicitly sanctioned, the notion that the government could arbi-
trarily and unilaterally determine loyalty and take punitive measure against 
those it deemed disloyal.58 
Thus, without ever directly addressing the question of indefinitely imprison-
ing U.S. citizens without due process, the Supreme Court allowed the intern-
ment to stand, abdicating its duty to enforce the Constitution59 and perpetuating 
the notion that “disloyalty” can be legitimately incorporated into the racialized 
identity of a particular ethnic group. As Neil Gotanda summarizes,  
[T]he separability of the juridical categories of “citizen” and “alien” is clear, as is the 
parallel social distinction between “American” and “foreign.”  But when the individu-
als concerned are other non-Whites, the racial considerations render the “natural” co-
incidence of citizen and American much less certain.  A Japanese-American citizen in 
1942 was easily considered “foreign,” thus making possible the judgment that likeli-
hood of disloyalty was high enough to justify wholesale internment.60 
III 
AMERICAN INDIANS: A LONG HISTORY OF INTERNMENTS 
It may well be doubted whether those [American Indian] tribes which reside within 
the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can with strict accuracy be de-
nominated foreign nations.  They may more correctly perhaps be denominated domes-
tic dependent nations.  They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent 
of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of posses-
sion ceases—meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)61 
The internment of Japanese Americans during World War II has been gen-
erally understood to be an aberration; an exception, as it were, that proves the 
rule of the United States’ fundamental commitment to constitutionally pro-
tected rights of due process and equal protection.  However, we need only en-
gage in only the most cursory review of the historical interactions between the 
 
 58. CWRIC, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 20, at 239. 
 59. Immediately after these cases were decided, Yale law professor Eugene Rostow summarized 
their import, noting that the Supreme Court had sanctioned 
five propositions of the utmost potential menace: (1) protective custody, extending over three 
or four years, is a permitted form of imprisonment in the United States; (2) political opinions, 
not criminal acts, may contain enough clear and present danger to justify such imprisonment; 
(3) men, women and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans and resident aliens can 
be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which require their imprisonment; (4) in 
time of war or emergency the military . . . can decide what political opinions require impris-
onment, and which ethnic groups are infected with them; and (5) the decision of the military 
can be carried out without indictment, trial, examination, jury, the confrontation of witnesses, 
counsel for the defense, the privilege against self-incrimination, or any of the other safeguards 
of the Bill of Rights. 
Rostow, supra note 3, at 532. 
 60. Neil Gotanda, “Other Non-Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1191 (1985). 
 61. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). 
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United States and American Indian peoples, on whose land it has established 
itself, to discover that the mass internment of civilians has been undertaken as a 
normal, rather than exceptional, prerogative by the federal government.62 
The native peoples of this land are in many respects the quintessential 
American “Other.” It was by contrasting their “savagery” against the “civiliza-
tion” of the settlers that the latter both legitimated their appropriation of the 
land and forged their identity as “Americans,” a perspective most clearly articu-
lated in the notion of American Manifest Destiny.63  Although the United States 
had entered into numerous treaties with American Indian nations, thereby ac-
knowledging them to be independent sovereignties,64 and, indeed, depended 
upon those treaties to justify its claims to much of its territory, by the 1830s the 
Supreme Court declared that the United States would no longer regard them as 
either independent or fully sovereign.65  As Chief Justice John Marshall de-
clared in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, “[t]hey may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations.  They occupy a territory to which we 
assert a title independent of their will. . . .  Their relation to the United States 
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”66  This declaration that all American 
Indian nations—even those the U.S. had not encountered as of the 1830s—
 
 62. The mass internment of civilians in wartime has also been common, as illustrated by the United 
States’ internment of much of the Filipino population in its war of “pacification” which began in 1898 
and its policy of forcing Vietnamese villagers into “strategic hamlets” during the war in Indochina.  On 
the Philippines, see THE PHILIPPINES READER: A HISTORY OF COLONIALISM, NEOCOLONIALISM, 
DICTATORSHIP, AND RESISTANCE 15-19 (1987) (Daniel B. Schirmer & Stephen Rosskamm Shalom 
eds.); Stuart Creighton Miller, “BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION”: THE AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE 
PHILIPPINES, 1899-1903 163-64 (1982).  On Vietnam, see DOUGLAS BLAUFARD, THE 
COUNTERINSURGENCY ERA: U.S. DOCTRINE AND PERFORMANCE 114-15, 120 (1977); D. MICHAEL 
SHAFER, DEADLY PARADIGMS: THE FAILURE OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY 268 (1988); 
NEIL SHEEHAN, A BRIGHT SHINING LIE: JOHN PAUL VANN AND AMERICA IN VIETNAM 308-312 
(1988). 
 63. See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAXONISM (1981); RICHARD DRINNON, FACING WEST: THE 
METAPHYSICS OF INDIAN-HATING AND EMPIRE-BUILDING (1980).  For an overview that does not 
address race, see generally FREDERICK MERK, MANIFEST DESTINY AND MISSION IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY: A REINTERPRETATION (1963). 
 64. See Siegfried Wiessner, American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 567, 591 (1995) (noting that the U.S. entered into such treaties “on a perfectly level 
playing field . . . extending to [the Indian nations] the same courtesies as to other nations of the then 
overwhelmingly European international legal order”).  For a compilation of ratified treaties, see gener-
ally CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (1940-41).  For documents omitted 
by Kappler, see generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY; TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 (1999). 
 65. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).  On this trilogy authored 
by Justice Marshall, see Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, 
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 382, 406-18 (1993); Helen W. 
Winston, “An Anomaly Unknown”: Supreme Court Application of International Law Norms on Indige-
nous Rights in the Cherokee Cases (1831-32), 1 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 339, 349-58 (1994). 
 66. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.  As Ward Churchill concludes, “[i]n practical effect, Marshall cast indige-
nous nations as entities inherently imbued with a sufficient measure of sovereignty to alienate their ter-
ritory by treaty when and wherever the U.S. desired they do so, but never with enough to refuse.”  
Ward Churchill, The Law Stood Squarely on Its Head: U.S. Legal Doctrine, Indigenous Self-
Determination and the Question of World Order, 81 OR. L. REV. 663, 677-78 (2002). 
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would henceforth be considered as internal colonies67 laid the groundwork for 
the U.S. government’s subsequent assertion of full and complete—“plenary”—
power over Indian affairs.68 
Indigenous peoples, while thus subjected to federal control, were not, how-
ever, considered “Americans.”  Somewhat ironically, while the U.S. govern-
ment was asserting complete power over them, the Supreme Court held in the 
1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins that the Fourteenth Amendment’s birthright citizen-
ship did not extend to American Indians: 
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and owing 
immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes, (an alien though dependent power,) 
although in a geographical sense born in the Unites States, are no more “born in the 
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” . . . than the children of subjects 
of any foreign government . . . .69 
With some exceptions, this was the case until 1924 when Congress unilaterally 
declared all American Indians to be U.S. citizens, whether they wanted to be or 
not.70 
In the meantime, every native people consigned to a reservation in the 
U.S.—effectively all 400-plus of them—was subjected to internment.71  While 
not generally phrased in those terms, the reality is evident in that until well into 
the twentieth century, American Indians were generally required to obtain a 
permit from a federal Indian agent—or in some cases the military—in order to 
leave their assigned agencies.  This was the issue in the 1879 Standing Bear case, 
which arose when a group of Poncas sent to a reservation in the “Indian Terri-
tory” of Oklahoma attempted to return to their traditional lands in eastern 
South Dakota without permission and were arrested by the army.72  Similarly, in 
the 1896 case of Ward v. Race Horse the Supreme Court ruled that the Lakotas 
were not free to exercise their treaty-guaranteed right to hunt in customary lo-
 
 67. On internal and settler-state colonialism, see Ward Churchill, The Indigenous Peoples of North 
America: A Struggle Against Internal Colonialism, in STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: NATIVE NORTH 
AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND COLONIZATION 15, 24-26 (2002). 
 68. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limita-
tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195; Robert A. Williams, Jr., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL 
THOUGHT (1990). 
 69. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 70. The General Allotment Act, sec. 6, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), declared all Indians born within the ter-
ritorial limits of the United States who accepted individual land allotment to be citizens.  Citizenship 
was imposed on all American Indians pursuant to acts passed in 1924 (43 Stat. 253, 2 June 1924) and 
1940 (Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1172, (1940)).  See generally Robert B. Por-
ter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native American: Redressing the Genocidal Act 
of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 (1999). 
 71. See, e.g., “The Reservation as Prison: Forced Confinement of Indians on Reservations” in 
SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND 
UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 204-06 (1994).  In fact, Indian reservations 
served as prototypes for the camps in which Japanese Americans were interned.  See RICHARD 
DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS, supra note 29; DILLON S. MYER AND AMERICAN 
RACISM xxiv, 265 (1987). 
 72. U.S. ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 Fed. Cas. 695 (C.C.D. Neb., 1879).  See generally 
THOMAS HENRY TIBBLES, THE PONCA CHIEFS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE TRIAL OF STANDING BEAR 
(1972). 
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cales beyond the boundaries of their reservations.73  It was not until the By-a-lil-
le case in 1909 that a formal opinion was rendered holding that American Indi-
ans could not be classified or treated as “prisoners of war” merely because they 
were Indians.74 
Although “military necessity” and “national security” were frequently in-
voked to justify the mass internment of American Indians, war was rarely a de-
termining factor.75  No hostilities were occurring during the 1830s, when, for ex-
ample, the army was employed to round up the Cherokees, holding them in 
stockades until they were sent onto the “Trail of Tears,” a 1,200 mile forced 
march from their Georgia/North Carolina homeland to Oklahoma during which 
about half of them died.  This is also true with respect to the other four “Civi-
lized Tribes”—Choctaws, Chickasaws, Creeks, and Seminoles—all of whom had 
shared the Cherokees’ fate by 1840.76  Although they occurred during peacetime, 
President Andrew Jackson claimed, just as officials did with respect to Japanese 
Americans a century later, that the forced evacuations were motivated, at least 
in part, by a need to “protect” the Indians from the racial antipathy of their 
white neighbors.77 
 
 73. Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896). 
 74. U.S. v. By-a-lil-le, 12 Ariz. 150 (1909); see also HARRING, supra note 71, at 198-203.  The gov-
ernment’s contention in By-a-lil-le that Indians comprised a peculiar category of prisoners of war and 
that no law governed when such prisoners should be released is remarkably similar to its current posi-
tion with respect to “enemy combatants” such as Hamdi, Padilla, and those held at Guantánamo Bay.  
See infra notes 184-205,  224-28 and accompanying text. 
 75. It is difficult to assess exactly what constituted an “Indian war,” since Congress never declared 
one.  A peculiar ambiguity attends the term, similar to that attending the present “war on terror,” 
which was perhaps best summed up by the Supreme Court’s observation in Marks v. United States that, 
notwithstanding the war-making requirements posited in the Constitution, “to constitute an Indian war, 
it is sufficient that hostilities exist and that military operations are carried on.”  161 U.S. 297, 302-03 
(1895).  On its face, this would mean that the U.S. was continuously engaged in one or more Indian 
wars from its first moment until some point in the early twentieth century.  This, however, has been of-
ficially and repeatedly denied, as illustrated by the conclusion of the 1890 census that Indian wars were 
only “about 40 in number.”  See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, REPORT ON 
INDIANS TAXED AND NOT TAXED IN THE UNITED STATES (EXCEPT ALASKA) AT THE ELEVENTH 
U.S. CENSUS: 1890 637 (1894). 
 76. See RUSSELL THORNTON, THE CHEROKEES: A POPULATION HISTORY 75-77 (1990).  Accord-
ing to Thornton, “The Choctaws are said to have lost 15 percent of their population, 6,000 out of 
40,000; and the Chickasaw . . . surely suffered severe losses as well. By contrast, the Creeks and Semi-
noles are said to have suffered about 50 percent mortality.”  Russell Thornton, Cherokee Population 
Losses During the Trail of Tears: A New Perspective and a New Estimate, 31 ETHNOHISTORY 293 
(1984).  See generally GRANT FOREMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE IMMIGRATION OF THE FIVE 
CIVILIZED TRIBES (1953); GLORIA JAHODA, THE TRAIL OF TEARS: THE STORY OF THE INDIAN 
REMOVALS (1975).  For an interesting overview framed in juxtaposition to the Japanese American in-
ternment, see EDWARD H. SPICER, ASAEL I. HANSEN, KATHERINE LUOMALA & MARVIN K. OPLER, 
THE IMPOUNDED PEOPLE: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE RELOCATION CENTERS 46 (1969). 
 77. According to Jackson, the purpose of Indian Removal was humanitarian, that is, to “separate 
the Indians from immediate contact with settlements of whites; free them from the power of the States; 
enable them to pursue happiness [and] retard the progress of decay, which is lessening their numbers.”  
“Message of the President to Congress on Indian Removal,” Dec. 6, 1830.  For this and numerous com-
parable statements, see U.S. Congress Staff, Speeches on the Passage of the Bill for the Removal of the 
Indians: Proceedings of the U.S. Congress, 21st, 1st Session, 1829-1830 (1988).  Regarding the Japanese 
American internment, see, e.g., the expressions of concern quoted in ROGER DANIELS, 
CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND WORLD WAR II 47, 156 (1972) (quoting 
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Even when warfare was involved, the mass internment of civilians most of-
ten occurred after the fighting was over and typically lasted for years, even gen-
erations.  In the aftermath of the 1862 “Little Crow’s War” in Minnesota, for in-
stance, virtually the entire Santee Sioux population was interned at Fort 
Snelling, where conditions were so miserable that one-quarter of them died 
within several months, and a $200 scalp bounty was proclaimed on all Santees 
found outside the concentration camp.78  Similarly, following the army’s so-
called Kit Carson Campaign in 1863, the Navajos were first concentrated at Fort 
Defiance, Arizona, and then force-marched approximately 300 miles to the 
Bosque Redondo, adjoining Fort Sumner, New Mexico, where they were in-
terned for four years.  Lodged in crude shelters (sometimes literally holes in the 
ground), restricted to subsistence rations at best, and wracked by disease, half 
of the internees perished before they were moved to another reservation in 
1868.79 
The harsh conditions at the San Carlos Reservation in southeastern Ari-
zona, where the far-flung western Apache peoples were increasingly concen-
trated, precipitated the escape and protracted military resistance mounted by a 
band of Chiricahua Apaches led by Geronimo during the 1870s and 1880s.80  In 
retaliation, after Geronimo’s surrender in 1886, the government shipped the en-
tire Chiricahua population, including not only children, elders, and women, but 
also those men who had fought for the U.S. against their “renegade” relatives, 
to military barracks in Florida and Alabama.  There they were confined in an 
utterly alien climate, with a resulting death toll of some forty percent, until the 
winter of 1913-14.81  By that point, with even U.S. officials acknowledging that it 
was “too much to keep people more than 26 years in confinement for crimes 
 
expressions of concern by Sec. of Agriculture Claude Wickard and Gen. George C. Marshall); 
DRINNON, KEEPER OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS, supra note 29, at 30, 36 (quoting Gen. DeWitt and 
Asst. Sec. of War John J. McCloy). 
 78. They were then relocated to an even harsher facility at Crow Creek, in the Dakota Territory, 
where another quarter died within the first year.  See DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED 
KNEE: AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 60, 63-64 (1970); DUANE SCHULTZ, OVER THE 
EARTH I COME: THE GREAT SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862, 279-83 (1992). 
 79. See generally CLIFFORD E. TRAFZER, THE KIT CARSON CAMPAIGN: THE LAST GREAT 
NAVAJO WAR (1982); LYNN R. BAILEY, THE LONG WALK: A HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO WARS, 1846-
68 (1988); LYNN R. BAILEY, BOSQUE REDONDO: THE NAVAJO INTERNMENT AT FORT SUMNER, NEW 
MEXICO, 1863-1868 (1998); GERALD THOMPSON, THE ARMY AND THE NAVAJO: THE BOSQUE 
REDONDO RESERVATION EXPERIMENT, 1863-1868 (1982). 
 80. See MICHAEL LIEDER & JAKE PAGE, WILD JUSTICE: THE PEOPLE OF GERONIMO VS. THE 
UNITED STATES 19-20 (1997); OBIE B. FAULK, THE GERONIMO CAMPAIGN 16 (1969); RICHARD J. 
PERRY, APACHE RESERVATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE AMERICAN  STATE 129-36 (1993). 
 81. The attritional warfare waged against them by the U.S. reduced the Chiricahuas from an esti-
mated 3,000 in 1855 to barely 500 in 1885.  Their first eight years of internment in the east brought the 
number down to roughly 300, an overall population decline of 90 percent in a single generation.  
LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 80, at 28-38.  See generally W. SKINNER, THE APACHE ROCK CRUMBLES 
(1987); DAVID ROBERTS, ONCE THEY MOVED LIKE THE WIND: COCHISE, GERONIMO AND THE 
APACHE WARS (1984). 
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they never committed,” the survivors were transferred to a reservation in Okla-
homa.82 
In the winter of 1878-79, 15,000 U.S. troops were sent in pursuit of small 
group of several hundred Northern Cheyenne, primarily noncombatant women 
and children, who fled the desperate conditions of their internment near Fort 
Sill, Oklahoma.83  General Philip Sheridan, commander of U.S. forces in the re-
gion, ordered his men to “spare no measure . . . to kill or capture” the fugitives 
as rapidly as possible and thus deter other peoples from following the Chey-
ennes’ example.84  Captured and informed they would be returned to Okla-
homa, the Cheyenne fled again.  This time they were quickly tracked down and 
about half of them, children included, simply butchered.85  An even more egre-
gious instance occurred on December 29, 1890—nearly thirteen years after the 
last of the “Sioux Wars”—when the U.S. Seventh Cavalry Regiment, using 
Hotchkiss guns, massacred more than 300 unarmed Minneconjou Lakotas cap-
tured on the Wounded Knee Creek in western South Dakota.  Their sole “of-
fense” was to have fled their assigned agency near Fort Yates during a period of 
starvation and severe repression,  seeking refuge among their Oglalla relatives at 
the Pine Ridge Agency, about 150 miles away.86 
The long term internment of numerous indigenous peoples—men and 
women, children and elders—under extremely harsh conditions, was thus an in-
tegral part—along with broken treaties, aggressive warfare and explicitly geno-
cidal policies87 of the United States’ strategy for occupying all of the land 
within its claimed territorial boundaries.  By early 1942, when the internment of 
Japanese Americans was undertaken, the terms under which their Indian coun-
 
 82. LEIDER & PAGE, supra note 80, at 48, citing CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 48 Cong. Rec. S11336-
7 (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1912). 
 83. For background on the extended warfare precipitated by U.S. invasions of Cheyenne territory 
beginning in the 1840s, see generally GEORGE BIRD GRINNELL, THE FIGHTING CHEYENNES (1955 
reprint of 1915 original).  For more detail on particular phases, see generally STAN HOIG, THE SAND 
CREEK MASSACRE (1961) and THE BATTLE OF THE WASHITA (1976). 
 84. DONALD J. BERTHRONG, THE CHEYENNE AND ARAPAHO ORDEAL: RESERVATION AND 
AGENCY LIFE IN THE INDIAN TERRITORY, 1875-1907 34 (1976).  General Sheridan is famous for his 
1869 observation that the only good Indians he had ever seen were dead ones (popularized as “the only 
good Indian is a dead Indian”).  See PAUL ANDREW HUTTON, PHIL SHERIDAN AND HIS ARMY 180 
(1985). 
 85. See MARI SANDOZ, CHEYENNE AUTUMN 245-90 (1964 reprint of 1953 original); RALPH K. 
ANDRIST, THE LONG DEATH: THE LAST DAYS OF THE PLAINS INDIAN 321-29 (1964). 
 86. On the last of the wars, see generally JOHN E. GRAY, THE CENTENNIAL CAMPAIGN: THE 
SIOUX WAR OF 1876 (1988).  On the Lakotas’ confinement during the intervening period, see generally 
GEORGE HYDE, RED CLOUD’S FOLK: A HISTORY OF THE OGLALLA SIOUX INDIANS (1937) and  
SPOTTED TAIL’S FOLK: A HISTORY OF THE BRULE SIOUX (1961).  On the massacre, see ANDRIST, su-
pra note 85, at 350-52; BROWN, supra note 78, at 401-02.  Since both agencies were situated within the 
“Great Sioux Reservation,” the Indians had never ventured beyond the boundaries of what was ac-
knowledged by the U.S. as being their own territory.  See the map entitled “Sioux Cessions and Land 
Claims” in IRREDEEMABLE AMERICA: THE INDIANS’ ESTATE AND LAND CLAIMS 122-23 (IMRE 
SUTTON ED., 1985). 
 87. See generally WARD CHURCHILL, A LITTLE MATTER OF GENOCIDE: HOLOCAUST AND 
DENIAL IN THE AMERICAS, 1492 TO THE PRESENT (1997); WARD CHURCHILL, PERVERSIONS OF 
JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ANGLOAMERICAN LAW (2003) [hereinafter PERVERSIONS OF 
JUSTICE]. 
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terparts were confined had improved to a certain extent.88  For all intents and 
purposes, however, the American Indian internment would continue until the 
mid-1950s, long after the Japanese Americans had been released, when the U.S. 
government finally decided that its interests were better served by “terminat-
ing” its relationship with the American Indians, abruptly pushing them off the 
reservations and dispersing them in cities.89  Interestingly, Dillon S. Myer, who 
as director of the War Relocation Authority had managed the Japanese Ameri-
can internment, was designated to oversee this attempted “final solution of the 
Indian problem” in the U.S.90 
Unlike Japanese Americans, American Indians have never received indi-
vidual or collective compensation of any sort for the far more protracted peri-
ods of internment they suffered at the hands of the United States.  In 1947 the 
Chiricahuas filed a claim with the Indian Claims Commission (ICC)91 for dam-
ages accruing both from the expropriation of their lands and from their lengthy 
imprisonment in Florida and Alabama.  In 1971 the ICC finally awarded them 
token payment for their lost lands, but asserted it had no jurisdiction over the 
imprisonment claim on the grounds that the incarceration did not violate any 
treaty.92  The Commission’s ruling was appealed, but in 1973, the Court of 
Claims, while acknowledging “with studied understatement that ‘the Apache 
Tribe did not prosper’ from twenty-seven years of imprisonment,”93 held that 
the U.S. was not liable.  The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari,94 
thus casting an aura of legitimacy over the “principle” that the U.S. government 
holds the prerogative to intern entire populations at will. 
 
 88. It must be pointed out, however, that some of the Japanese American internment camps were 
actually built on American Indian reservations, and that the barracks hastily constructed for them, 
crude as they were, were still better than much of the reservation housing.  Apparently at Poston, when 
the war was over, instead of turning over the barracks and leaving the trees and crops, the government 
plowed everything under and prevented the reservation residents from even salvaging any of the build-
ing materials.  See Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the “Model Minority” Ideology of Acquiescence: The 
Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV  9 /19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
385 (joint issue) (1998). 
 89. See generally GARY ORFIELD, A STUDY OF TERMINATION POLICY (1966); DONALD L. 
FIXICO, TERMINATION AND RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986). 
 90. Richard Drinnon notes, “An accident of chronology has masked the underlying meaning of 
Myer’s termination policy.  Had he been commissioner of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] before he be-
came director of the [War Relocation Authority], then the continuities stretching from the reservations 
to the camps could hardly have been missed and the fundamental sameness of his treatment of Native 
Americans and Japanese Americans would have elicited close analysis long ago.” DRINNON, KEEPER 
OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS, supra note 29, at 265.  In an unpublished paper written during the mid-
1950s, former Indian Commissioner John Collier described his successor’s termination policy as 
amounting to a program of deliberate “social genocide” against Native Americans.  In a paper of his 
own, written at about the same time, Myer concurred.  Id. at 242-43. 
 91. On the ICC see generally Ward Churchill, Charades Anyone? The Indian Claims Commission 
in Context in PERVERSIONS OF JUSTICE, supra note 87, at 125-52 (noting that the ICC was established 
in 1946 in an attempt to distinguish U.S. land appropriations from those of the Third Reich); HARVEY 
D. ROSENTHAL, THEIR DAY IN COURT: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION (1990). 
 92. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 26 Ind. Cl. Comm. 281 (1971). 
 93. LIEDER & PAGE, supra note 80, at 222. 
 94. Fort Sill Apache Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 477 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 993 (1974). 
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American Indians are, in many respects, prototypical “non-aliens”: their na-
tions were first acknowledged as independent sovereigns, then were deemed to 
be “domestic dependent nations.”  This appellation continues to be accurate in 
light of their still-colonized status under which the federal government exercises 
plenary power over them, but recognizes their “quasi-sovereign” status when 
convenient.95  That many became U.S. citizens pursuant to the 1887 Allotment 
Act did not affect the government’s ability to collectively treat them as prison-
ers of war, and internment has been a routine part of the U.S. government’s at-
tempts to control indigenous peoples and their lands and resources.96 
IV 
INTERNMENT AS A DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPTION 
[Under the Internal Security Act of 1950] the President was authorized to declare an 
“internal security emergency” during which the Attorney General was empowered to 
detain all persons for whom there was “reasonable ground” for believing [they] 
“probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of es-
pionage or sabotage” . . . . 
Robert Justin Goldstein, Political Repression in Modern America97 
 
Mass internment has thus been used throughout American history to control 
civilian populations considered Other by virtue of race or national origin and 
deemed a threat to national security.  Internment has also been considered a vi-
able option for dealing with those who threaten the political status quo, and po-
litical dissidents have often been characterized as aliens or under the influence 
of foreign powers or ideologies.  A brief overview of this history illustrates that 
much of what is now happening in the “war on terror” is simply an extension of 
this long-standing practice.   
Even before the formal existence of the republic, Thomas Jefferson partici-
pated in drafting Virginia laws that allowed the government to remove citizens 
beyond “military zones” and “to restrain all persons who refused to take the 
oath of loyalty to the American cause or who were merely suspected of disaffec-
 
 95. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, Colo-
nial Subjects, and Why U.S.  Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate International Law, 20 YALE L. & POL. 
REV. 429, 451-55 (2002). 
 96. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text. 
 97. ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO 
1976, 322 (2001) (referencing the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 
987 (1950)).  These provisions were in Title II, known as the Emergency Detention Act of 1950.  See 
Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptation of 9/11, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1018 (noting that at least 26,000 individuals were at one point catalogued on an 
FBI list of persons to be rounded up in the event of a “national emergency”); Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., 
Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REV. 383, 396 (1951) (noting that Truman vetoed the bill, 
which passed, nonetheless, because the detention provisions failed to provide for suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus and because other persons might be more important to detain). 
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tion.”98  As Governor of Virginia, Jefferson did not order mass evacuations, but 
he “did exercise his power to imprison the disaffected or politically suspect, and 
many languished in jail without a hearing or even a court-martial.”99 
In 1798, the first Alien and Sedition Acts100 were passed on the Federalists’ 
claim that the Jeffersonians were agents of France attempting to bring the 
French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror” to the United States.101  The institution 
of slavery can also be viewed, of course, as an officially protected and supported 
form of mass internment, economically motivated but sanctioned on the basis of 
race.102  It was an essential aspect of the initial American status quo, well pro-
tected by the Constitution,103 and those who spoke out against slavery’s cruelties 
and advocated abolition were frequently charged with sedition.104 
Union organizers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were la-
beled “communists” and “anarchists,” and working class unrest was blamed on 
immigrants.  The labor disputes which accompanied the depression of 1873-
1877, particularly the fiercely contested strikes of railroad workers and miners, 
were consistently depicted as the work of outside agitators.105  During the 1880s 
and 1890s immigrants continued to be conflated with anarchists and were “vari-
ously referred to as ‘the very scum and offal of Europe,’ ‘venomous reptiles,’ . . . 
and ‘that class of heartless and revolutionary agitators’ who had come ‘to ter-
rorize the community and to exalt the red flag of the commune above the stars 
and stripes.’”106 
Congress, which had not regulated immigration at all until 1875, passed a se-
ries of acts in the 1880s and 1890s excluding Chinese workers, portrayed as the 
“yellow peril,”107 and soon began debating proposals to exclude and deport 
 
 98. LEONARD W. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 31-32 (1989).  Jef-
ferson was also instrumental in the drafting of a statute which gave Virginia authorities immunity from 
suits brought by evacuated or interned persons.  Id. at 32. 
 99. Id. at 33. 
 100. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) amended at 41 Stat. 1008 (1920); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 
Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
 101. Richard O. Curry, Introduction, in FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, CENSORSHIP, AND 
REPRESSION IN THE 1980S 3, 5 (Richard O. Curry ed., 1988); WILLIAM PRESTON, JR., ALIENS & 
DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS 1903-1933 21-22 (2d ed. 1994). 
 102. See generally IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF 
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA (1998). 
 103. U.S. CONST. art. II,  §  8, cl. 15; art. II, § 9, cl. 1; art. IV, §  2, cl. 3; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, 
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996); Staugh-
ton Lynd, Slavery and the Founding Fathers, in BLACK HISTORY: A REAPPRAISAL 115 (Melvin Drim-
mer ed., 1968). 
 104. On this basis the postmaster refused to allow abolitionist literature to be sent through the mail, 
and the House of Representatives employed a “gag” rule to prevent discussion of the subject.  See Mi-
chael Kent Curtis, The Crisis Over the Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 161-205 (PAUL FINKELMAN ED., 1987); see also WINTHROP 
D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO 1550-1812, 329-30 
(1968). 
 105. PRESTON, supra note 101, at 24-25; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 3-101. 
 106. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 41. 
 107. See Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (suspending the immigration of all Chinese laborers 
for ten years); additional Chinese exclusion laws were passed in 1884, 1888, and 1892.  See generally 
10_SAITO_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:36 AM 
192 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 68:173 
“alien anarchists.”  In 1903 Congress prohibited the immigration of anarchists—
those who believed in or advocated the overthrow of government by force and 
violence, and anyone “who disbelieve[d] in” organized government or was “af-
filiated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief”108—the 
first federal legislation to ban immigrants on the basis of their beliefs or associa-
tions.  Although the 1903 Act was portrayed as a response to the 1901 assassina-
tion of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz, Czolgosz was a U.S.-born citizen 
with only vague anarchist connections.109 
During World War I the Justice Department tried to convince President 
Woodrow Wilson to try civilians accused of interfering with the war effort be-
fore military courts martial.110  That effort failed, but Wilson did sign the Espio-
nage Act, which made it a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or publish any 
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the United States, and 
which allowed the post office to exclude from the mails any material advocating 
“treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the U.S.”111  The following year 
the Sedition Act112 was passed, prohibiting essentially all criticism of the war or 
the government.  Robert Justin Goldstein reports: 
 
Altogether, over twenty-one hundred [persons] were indicted under the Espionage and Sedi-
tion laws, invariably for statements of opposition to the war rather than for any overt acts, and 
over one thousand persons were convicted.  Over one hundred persons were sentenced to jail 
terms of ten years or more.  Not a single person was ever convicted for actual spy activities.”
113
 
   
As Japanese Americans would be in World War II, African Americans were 
particularly targeted in the hunt for subversives and draft evaders, due to “the 
widespread suspicion among whites that . . . enemy agents were actively sub-
verting the loyalties of African Americans, who were believed to be uniquely 
susceptible to those who would manipulate them for sinister purposes.”114 
In the meantime, the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation (the 
precursor to the FBI) collaborated with the American Protective League 
(APL), a group of some 350,000 private citizens, infiltrating organizations they 
considered detrimental to U.S. interests and making illegal arrests and deten-
 
ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1943 (Sucheng Chan 
ed., 1991); LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF 
MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). 
 108. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, §  2, 32 Stat. 1219.  See Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) 
(holding that the Act did not violate the First Amendment). 
 109. See PRESTON, supra note 101, at 27-33. 
 110. SANFORD J. UNGER, FBI 41-42 (1976).   
 111. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1918). 
 112. Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
 113. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 113; see also MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 33-67(1990). 
 114. THEODORE KORNWEIBEL, JR., “INVESTIGATE EVERYTHING”: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO 
COMPEL BLACK LOYALTY DURING WORLD WAR I 3 (2002). 
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tions of activists.115  In a highly effective effort to subvert organized labor, they 
conducted large scale raids and vigilante actions against members of the Indus-
trial Workers of the World.  The raids, acknowledged to have been carried out 
“largely as a preventative matter to prevent possible violence,”116 were followed 
by pre-indictment detentions of up to two years, mass trials in which the defen-
dants were sometimes not even identified by name, and the imposition of 
lengthy prison sentences.117 
In 1919, following a series of bombings around the country, Attorney Gen-
eral A. Mitchell Palmer declared war on radicals and subversives.  When he 
failed to convince Congress to enact peacetime sedition legislation, he relied on 
the 1918 Alien Act to conduct raids, known as “Red raids” and later as the 
“Palmer raids,” in thirty-three cities, arresting and holding 10,000 people, both 
citizens and noncitizens, as “criminal anarchists.”118  Using tactics similar to 
those we have seen with respect to the post-September 11 detainees, hundreds 
of people were held for months in harsh and squalid conditions, denied contact 
with their families, friends, and lawyers, and many were subsequently de-
ported.119 
By the 1930s the FBI “had launched significant and tacitly illegal . . . investi-
gations of supposed subversion in [numerous] industries, as well as various edu-
cational institutions, organized labor, assorted youth groups, black organiza-
tions, governmental affairs and the armed forces,”120 and was creating files on 
millions of Americans.  The “Cold War” that followed World War II illustrated 
that the pursuit of those considered disloyal was not to be limited to periods of 
actual warfare, but extended indefinitely.  In 1947 President Truman authorized 
the Justice Department to seek out “infiltration of disloyal persons” within the 
government and to create a list of “subversive” organizations.  By 1954 the Jus-
tice department had listed hundreds of organizations and “sympathetic associa-
tion” as well as membership was considered evidence of disloyalty.121  “Commu-
nism,” like anarchism, became a catch-all, a vaguely defined “enemy” against 
 
 115. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 111; see also WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, 
AGENTS OF REPRESSION: THE FBI’S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT 18 (2d ed. 2002). 
 116. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 117 (quoting statement of the U.S. attorney for Kansas to a Jus-
tice Department official); see also CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra note 115, at 19. 
 117. At the same time, Justice Department and APL “volunteers” were conducting “slacker raids” 
in which an estimated 400,000 men were seized and detained for not carrying draft cards.  GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 97, at 111-12.  Less than one-half of one percent of those arrested were actually draft resist-
ers.  UNGER, supra note 110, at 42. 
 118. See CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra note 115 at 20-23; UNGER, supra note 110 
at 43-44. 
 119. On the post September 11 detentions, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 120. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra note 115, at 29; see also id. at 26-28. 
 121. Id. at 32.  Truman’s directive was contained in Executive Order 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 
21, 1947). 
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whom an undeclared “war” could be fought and increasingly restrictive meas-
ures imposed on the U.S. population.122 
The Internal Security Act of 1950, also known as the McCarran Act, re-
quired all members of “Communist-front” organizations to register with the 
federal government and adopted a proposal, not rescinded until 1971, that spe-
cial “detention centers” be established for incarcerating those so registered, 
without trial, any time the president chose to declare an “internal security 
emergency.”123  In 1952 Congress allocated funds for the establishment of six de-
tention centers, including one at Tule Lake, where the “disloyal” had been seg-
regated during the Japanese American internment.124 
These provisions, like those supported by Jefferson, for the mass incarcera-
tion of civilians suspected of disloyalty to the prevailing order have not been 
utilized, perhaps because other equally effective ways of destroying mass 
movements for social change were employed in the meantime.125  Nonetheless, 
the government has consistently associated political disloyalty with foreignness, 
and has maintained large-scale internment as an option for responding to inter-
nal political dissent.  In the meantime, it has embarked on a remarkably suc-
cessful program to incarcerate a large proportion of the civilian population that 
it acknowledges is composed primarily of citizens but that it nonetheless sees as 
“Other” and, therefore, threatening to the status quo—poor people and people 
of color. 
V 
INTERNING THE POOR AND PEOPLE OF COLOR: THE “WARS” ON CRIME AND 
DRUGS 
Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American life; they now 
threaten the future of every American. . . . To pursue our present course will involve 
 
 122. See generally ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 
(1998).  Her title is taken from Supreme Court Justice and Nuremberg Prosecutor Robert Jackson’s 
statement, “Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its name.”  United States 
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J. dissenting).  For an analysis of par-
allels between the Cold War and the war on terrorism, see generally David Cole, The New McCarthy-
ism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 123. 66 Stat. 163 (1950); see CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra note 115, at 33; 
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 423-24 (1980).  See generally Mari Ma-
tsuda, McCarthyism, The Internment and the Contradictions of Power, 40 B.C. L. REV./19 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. (joint issue) 9 (1998). 
 124. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 324. 
 125. The most obvious were the FBI’s Counterintelligence Programs (COINTELPROs) and similar 
programs of other intelligence and law enforcement agencies which began in the mid-1950s and, al-
though officially terminated in the 1970s, continue to this day.  See generally U.S. Senate, Select Com-
mittee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report: Intelli-
gence Activities and the Rights of Americans (S. Rep. No. 755, Bk. III) (Washington, D.C.: 94th Cong., 
2d Sess., 1976); WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: 
DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI’S SECRET WAR AGAINST DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2002); 
CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS, supra note 115; Natsu Taylor Saito, Whose Liberty?  Whose 
Security?  The USA PATRIOT Act in the Context of COINTELPRO and the Unlawful Repression of 
Political Dissent, 81 OR. L. REV. 1051 (2002). 
10_SAITO_FIXED PROOFS.DOC 11/22/2005  11:36 AM 
Spring 2005] INTERNING THE “NON-ALIEN” OTHER 195 
the continuing polarization of the American community and, ultimately, the destruc-
tion of basic democratic values.  The alternative is not blind repression or capitulation 
to lawlessness.  It is the realization of common opportunities for all within a single so-
ciety. . . .  It is time to make good the promises of American democracy to all citizens. 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)126 
Slavery was in many respects a government-sponsored, privately-run form 
of mass internment.  As Justice Taney articulated so clearly in the 1857 Dred 
Scott case, prior to the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
persons of African descent were not even considered “persons” under the law, 
much less citizens.127  Although their formal legal status changed dramatically as 
a result of the post-Civil War amendments, African Americans continued to be 
subjected to differential treatment as a result of “Jim Crow” laws128 and the dis-
parate treatment accorded them under the criminal justice system.129  As Justice 
Miller declared in the Slaughter-House Cases, the “black codes” passed by 
southern states after abolition “imposed upon the colored race onerous disabili-
ties and burdens and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and 
property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value.”130  African 
Americans and other people of color in the United States today are recognized 
as U.S. citizens, but nonetheless continue to be regarded as Other in ways that 
subject them to much the same kinds of treatment as that accorded those con-
sidered “non-aliens.”  Among other things, this involves the ongoing reality of 
large-scale incarceration. 
During the 1960s the United States faced massive challenges to the status 
quo, not only from organized social and political forces, such as the Civil Rights 
Movement, the women’s movement, massive anti-war mobilizations, and the re-
surgence of organized labor,131 but also from the hundreds of urban rebellions 
that rocked every major U.S. city.  In 1967, following “riots” in Newark, De-
troit, Cleveland, and nearly 150 other cities, President Lyndon Johnson con-
vened a National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (commonly called 
 
 126. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1-2 (1968) [hereinafter Kerner 
Commission Report].   
 127. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (describing the initial status of Afri-
can Americans as “beings of an inferior order”). 
 128. The U.S. system of legalized segregation was given the Supreme Court’s approval in  Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and not formally abolished until its decision in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation, 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
 129. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment 
for those convicted of crimes, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified 1865), and many southern legislatures 
responded by passing “black codes” that criminalized a wide range of behavior.  Combined with the 
convict lease system, this resulted in many African Americans, now convicts rather than slaves, being 
leased to their former masters. See generally MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER; 
CONVICT LEASING IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 1866-1928 (1996); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE 
THAN SLAVERY”:  PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996). 
 130. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); see also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., 
SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS 
75 (1996). 
 131. See ZINN, supra note 123, at 435-528; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 97, at 429-545; CHRISTIAN 
PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS 3-4, 33-35 (1999). 
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the “Kerner Commission” after its chair, Illinois governor Otto Kerner),132 
which concluded that the primary cause of the rebellions was “pervasive dis-
crimination and segregation in employment, education and housing” and the re-
sulting “frustrations of powerlessness” that permeated the “ghettos.”133  Despite 
its stated awareness of the underlying causes of and solutions for “social disor-
der,” the government’s primary response since the late 1960s has been to wage 
an ever-intensifying “war on crime.”134 
Nixon had assumed office on a “law and order” platform and, perhaps be-
cause he soon discovered that there was little federal jurisdiction over most 
criminal activity, he rapidly declared war on drugs, announcing to Congress in 
June 1971 that “[t]he problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emer-
gency.”135  In the meantime, the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act had weakened constitutional protections and expanded surveillance op-
tions;136 the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 
had dramatically expanded drug and law enforcement agency budgets;137 and the 
1970 Organized Crime Control Act, which included the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, loosened evidentiary rules, allowed for 
seizures of the assets of any organization deemed a criminal conspiracy, created 
twenty-five-year sentences for “dangerous adult offenders,” and empowered se-
cret “special grand juries” with broad subpoena authority.138   The RICO Act, a 
chapter of the Federal Criminal Code created under Title IX, was purportedly 
aimed at organized crime, but immediately used against political activists such 
as the Black Panther Party and the Puerto Rican independence movement.139   
With massive federal subsidies available for weapons, training, prison construc-
tion, and automated information systems, many states followed the federal 
lead,140 the most dramatic example being New York Governor Nelson Rockefel-
 
 132. Kerner Commission Report, supra note 126, at 32.  The Commission was established pursuant 
to Executive Order 11365, 29 July 1967. 
 133. Id. at 10-11. 
 134. Lyndon Johnson announced to Congress in March 1965, “We must arrest and reverse the trend 
toward lawlessness,” despite the fact that his Crime Commission reported shortly thereafter that there 
was no significant increase in crime, and that “[v]irtually every generation since the founding of the Na-
tion . . . has felt itself threatened by the specter of rising crime and violence.”  ROBERT M. CIPES, THE 
CRIME WAR: THE MANUFACTURED CRUSADE 3, 8 (1968). 
 135. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR 173 (2d ed. 1999).  Nixon had claimed a ten-fold 
increase in the number of addict/users, an figure derived “not from any flood of new addicts reported to 
federal authorities in 1970 or 1971 but from a statistical reworking of the 1969 data.” Id. at 174.  As the 
1972 election approached, this number was arbitrarily reduced as evidence of success in the drug war.  
Id. at 177. 
 136. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). 
 137. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970). 
 138. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970). 
 139. See R. Stephen Stigall, Preventing Absurd Application of RICO: A Proposed Amendment to 
Congress’ Definition of “Racketeering Activity” in the Wake of  National Organization for Women, Inc. 
v. Scheidler, 68 TEMPLE L.REV. 223, 243 (1995). 
 140. These funds were distributed through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA), created by the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act.  See Comment, Federal Interference with Checks and 
Balances in State Government: A Constitutional Limit on the Spending Power, 128 U. PENN. L. REV. 402 
(1979) (noting that by 1976, 20 percent of most state budgets came from such federal funding). 
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ler’s implementation of draconian drug laws with mandatory life sentences, 
even for sixteen-year-olds, and his request that President Nixon and New York 
City Mayor John Lindsay set up “emergency camps” for detaining drug ad-
dicts.141 
Under the Reagan administration, the drug war’s focus on “foreign” ene-
mies was intensified, with large scale operations targeting Mexico and Turkey 
and an increased focus on immigrants as drug traffickers.  This set the stage for 
heightened military involvement, facilitated by amending the Posse Comitatus 
Act142 and welcomed as a way of maintaining military budgets in a time of ap-
parent peace.143  Federal police powers continued to be strengthened, as the 
1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act allowed federal preventive detention, 
established mandatory minimum sentences, eliminated federal parole, scaled 
back the insanity defense, increased penalties for acts of “terrorism,” and 
greatly expanded asset forfeiture provisions.144  The Bail Reform Act,145 also 
passed in 1984, greatly expanded the use of preventive detention.  Despite Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall’s argument that “[s]uch statutes, consistent with the us-
ages of tyranny and what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state, 
have long been thought incompatible with the fundamental human rights pro-
tected by the Constitution,” the Supreme Court upheld the practice in United 
States v. Salerno on the ground that preventive detention is regulatory, not pu-
nitive.146  While purportedly designed to keep “drug kingpins, violent offenders 
and other obvious threats to the community” incarcerated while awaiting trial, 
it was immediately used to keep political resisters incarcerated, “provid[ing] the 
FBI with a weapon far superior to the strategy of pretext arrests” in detaining, 
among others, the Puerto Rican independentistas, Resistance Conspiracy defen-
dants, and Irish Republican Army asylum seekers.147 
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act provided new mandatory minimum sen-
tences without possibility of parole, including the requirement of a five-year 
minimum for possession of 500 grams of powdered cocaine but only five grams 
of crack cocaine, a notorious disparity in light of the fact that powdered cocaine 
 
 141. EPSTEIN, supra note 135, at 43. 
 142. See Kevin Fisher, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control: Slamming the Stable Door After 
the Horse Has Bolted, 16 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 353, 391(1984); see also EVA BERTRAM, MORRIS 
BLACHMAN, KENNETH SHARPE, & PETER ANDREAS, DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 
112 (1996). 
 143. For an update on the heightened role of the military in the domestic “war on terror,” see gen-
erally Ann Scales & Laura Spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial Complex, 1 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 541 (2003). 
 144. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1989 (1984); see PARENTI, 
supra note 131, at 50-51 (maintaining that nationally gross receipts from seizures went from approxi-
mately $100 million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1987). 
 145. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 3141-3150, 3156 (1994). 
 146. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 147. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 125, at il; see also Laura 
Whitehorn, “Preventive Detention,” in CAGES OF STEEL (Ward Churchill & J. J. Vander Wall eds., 
1992) at 365-77.  The “Resistance Conspiracy” cases involved charges of seditious conspiracy against 
seven white activists protesting U.S. war crimes. 
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is used much more frequently by white Americans and crack by African Ameri-
cans.148  The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act expanded use of the federal death pen-
alty; created a “drug czar” to coordinate between law enforcement, military, 
and intelligence agencies; allocated funds to the Department of Defense to train 
law enforcement officers; and further increased the severity of mandatory 
minimum sentences.149 
Notwithstanding the emphasis given the war on drugs during the 1980s, na-
tional surveys indicated that, as of July 1989, only twenty percent of the Ameri-
can people considered drugs their most pressing national problem.150  Nonethe-
less, in September, in his first televised speech as president, George Bush 
“declared a national consensus on the primacy of this issue ’All of us agree 
that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is drugs’—and then de-
clared war, calling for ‘an assault on every front.’  Urging Americans to ‘face 
this evil as a nation united,’ Bush proclaimed that ‘victory over drugs is our 
cause, a just cause.’”151  Shortly after this speech, sixty-four percent of those 
polled had decided that it was, after all, the nation’s most pressing problem and 
sixty-two percent were willing to give up “a few of the freedoms we have in this 
country” to the war on drugs.152 
There is no evidence that these “wars” have reduced drug use or crime 
rates.153  Despite the public perception of increasing crime, the overall crime rate 
has remained stable since the early 1970s.154  Nonetheless, in 1972 there were 
just under 200,000 people in U.S. prisons; by 1985 there were 500,000; and by 
1997 1.2 million, plus another 500,000 in local jails.155  The United States now has 
one of the world’s highest per capita incarceration rates, and imprisons more 
 
 148. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).  See generally Jason A. Gillmer, United States v. 
Clary: Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497 (1995); William Spade, Jr., Be-
yond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233 (1996). 
 149. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4184 (1988).  See generally Christopher D. Sullivan, User-
Accountability Provisions in the Anti-Drug Abuse At of 1988: Assaulting Civil Liberties in the War on 
Drugs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1989). 
 150. BERTRAM, ET AL., supra note 142, at 116. 
 151. Id. at 114. 
 152. Id. at 116. 
 153. PARENTI, supra note 131, at 59. 
 154. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Rate (based on reported crimes), the rate per 100,000 
population was at about 6,000 in 1980, dropped somewhat in the mid-80s, and was again at about 6,000 
in 1991.  The National Crime Survey (based on surveys to assess victimization, and generally assumed 
to be more accurate) reported a drop from nearly 12,000 in the early 1980s to about 9,000 in 1991.  
JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 26-30 (1996). 
 155. MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 9 (1999); see also JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL 
PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM CRIME 1-2 (2000).  According to a December 
1999 report of the General Accounting Office, the number of women in prison increased fivefold from 
13,400 in 1980 to 84,400 in 1998, with 72 percent of all women in federal prison serving time for drug 
offenses.  Nell Bernstein, Swept Away, in PRISON NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR 
66, 67 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2003). 
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people than any other country.156  Those targeted are predominantly poor peo-
ple and people of color.  Nationally, eighty percent of all persons facing felony 
charges are indigent, too poor to afford a lawyer even by the stringent standards 
courts apply.157  Recent studies report that African Americans are being incar-
cerated at nine times the rate of white Americans, and Latinos at four times 
that rate.  At current rates, nearly one in three black men and one in six Latinos 
will find themselves in state or federal prison.158  The use of the criminal justice 
system to control the poor and people of color is not new, but it appears to be 
intensifying.  While many factors such as the soaring profitability of the prison-
industrial complex and the political capital gained by appearing “tough on 
crime” contribute to the spiraling incarceration rate, it is also a very effective 
mechanism for maintaining the economic and racial status quo,159 one made 
more socially palatable by the portrayal of its primary targets as Other by virtue 
of race, and as the “enemy” by the declaration of war on crime and drugs.  If we 
step back and look at this reality not as a “crime problem” but in terms of the 
communities it affects, we see broad patterns of mass incarceration that dra-
matically disrupt family relations, social institutions, and economic prospects 
and make the ever-present threat of imprisonment a dominant consideration.160 
VI 
EXPANDED POLICE POWERS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
Our forefathers would be proud, really proud of what they see in America today. . . . 
Americans are generous to our neighbors in need.  Americans are tolerant toward our 
fellow citizens of every background. . . . And Americans are reaching out across the 
world to say:  We wage a war on the guilty, not the innocent. 
 
 156. As of 1997 the U.S. was incarcerating one of every 155 Americans, second only to Russia 
among the 59 nations in Europe, Asia, and North America for which data are available.  MAUER, supra 
note 155, at 19-23. 
 157. Stephen B. Bright, The Accused Get What the System Doesn’t Pay For, in PRISON NATION, su-
pra note 155, at 6; see also Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Defense Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, Nov. 2000, NCJ 179023. 
 158. See Michael A. Fletcher, “Crisis” of Black Males Gets High-Profile Look: Rights Panel Probes 
Crime, Joblessness, Other Ills, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1999, A2 (noting that in some states one in two 
black men are “under the supervision of the criminal justice system”); BARRY HOLMAN, MASKING 
THE DIVIDE: HOW OFFICIALLY REPORTED PRISON STATISTICS DISTORT THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
REALITIES OF PRISON GROWTH (Nat’l Ctr. On Inst. & Alternatives, 2001) 17, available at 
http://www.ncianet.org/ncia/mask.pdf: U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of Justice Statistics,  Criminal Of-
fender Statistics (2001); see generally DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); MAUER, supra note 155; MILLER, supra note 154. 
 159. See generally Noam Chomsky, Drug Policy as Social Control in PRISON NATION, supra note 
155, at 57.  On the profitability of prisons, see generally DYER, supra note 155. 
 160. For an overview of recent conditions in African American communities, see ANDREW 
HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (rev. ed.. 2003).  For 
American Indian communities, see Rennard Strickland, “You Can’t Rollerskate in a Buffalo Herd Even 
if You Have all the Medicine”: American Indian Law and Policy in his TONTO’S REVENGE: 
REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND POLICY 47-62 (1997); Ward Churchill, Unravel-
ing the Codes of Oppression, in FANTASIES OF THE MASTER RACE: LITERATURE, CINEMA AND THE 
COLONIZATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS xiv-xix (2d ed. 1998). 
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George W. Bush (Oct. 17, 2001)161 
With all of the police powers obtained in the war on drugs firmly en-
trenched, the 1990s saw a shift in emphasis from combating drugs to a “war on 
terrorism” in which the threat of an external Other has been used to dramati-
cally expand governmental prerogatives with respect to internal Others both 
citizens and noncitizen residents, people of color and those who dissent politi-
cally.  Much of the impetus for this new wave of legislation initially came from 
the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City fed-
eral building in 1995.162  In 1994 Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act,163 fulfilling President Clinton’s election year promise to 
put an additional 100,000 police officers on the street, providing more funds for 
state prisons, adding a “three strikes” mandatory life sentence provision, en-
hancing sentences for “gang members,” directing the sentencing commission to 
increase penalties for offenses committed in newly designated “drug free zones” 
and making those convicted of such offenses ineligible for parole, and authoriz-
ing the death penalty for numerous new categories of “terrorist activity.”164 
Despite the fact that the FBI had reported only two incidents of interna-
tional terrorism on U.S. soil between 1985 and 1996, Congress passed the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), whose “sweeping 
provisions served to license almost the full range of repressive techniques that 
had been quietly continued after COINTELPRO was supposedly termi-
nated.”165  The Act defines “national security” as encompassing the “national 
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States” and gives 
the Secretary of State broad authority to designate groups as “engaging in ter-
rorist activity” if they threaten “the security of United States nationals or the 
national security of the United States”166—a provision similar to that authorized 
by President Truman’s 1947 executive order.167  Under this Act it is a felony to 
provide any form of material support to designated organizations even if the 
 
 161. Excerpted Remarks by the President from Speech to the California Business Association in “WE 
WILL PREVAIL”: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH ON WAR, TERRORISM, AND FREEDOM 42, 45 (Na-
tional Review ed., 2003). 
 162. See Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Burning Only Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 694-95 (1998). 
 163. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 
(1994) (amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and therefore also referred 
to as the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act). 
 164. Id.; see also PARENTI, supra note 131, at 63.  
 165. CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 125, at li; see also, David 
B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legis-
lation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247 (1996) (noting the dangers of the anti-terrorism bills subse-
quently enacted as AEDPA); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United 
States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001) (noting the discriminatory applica-
tion of AEDPA). 
 166. DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 119 (2d ed. 2002). 
 167. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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support goes directly to an entirely lawful activity of the group,168 and nonciti-
zens can be deported on the basis of secret evidence for belonging to organiza-
tions deemed “terrorist,” without any showing of personal involvement in ter-
rorist or criminal activity—in other words, for engaging in what would 
otherwise be associations protected by the First Amendment.169 
At the same time Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which made it easier to deport 
immigrants not only for their political associations, but also for minor criminal 
convictions.170  Noncitizens, who were already excludable or deportable for seri-
ous criminal offenses and for virtually any drug offense, no matter how minor,171 
are now retroactively deportable for a wide range of minor crimes that have 
been redefined as “aggravated felonies.” As a result, numerous long-time per-
manent residents have been deported for misdemeanor pleas or convictions 
several decades old.172 
With the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Cen-
ter, the stage was set for the swift passage of the next level of police and intelli-
gence powers on the executive branch’s wish list,173 as U.S. citizens and perma-
nent residents were informed once again that they would have to “sacrifice 
some liberties” for their security.174  With Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 
dire warning that the “blood of the victims” of the next terrorist attack would 
be on Congress’ hands if they did not act quickly,175 the so-called USA 
PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate 
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act176 was rushed through 
 
 168. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 121-23. 
 169. William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 
Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 267 (2000). 
 170. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
 171. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (rewriting exclusion and deporta-
tion grounds and adopting provisions to ensure removal of criminal aliens). 
 172. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 117-26.  See generally David Cole, Hanging With the 
Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203 (1999); 
Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in 
the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833 (1997). 
 173. See CHANG, supra note 7, at 48; see also Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA 
PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in the Name of 
“Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (2002) (noting that the new powers are unneces-
sary, violate civil liberties, and go beyond the stated goal of fighting terrorism). 
 174. As in the war on drugs, apparently the public has once again agreed, with a 2002 survey indicat-
ing that “49 percent of the public now thinks that the First Amendment ‘goes too far,’ up from . . . 22 
percent in 2000.”  Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, n.1 
(2003) (citing Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, The Ideas Industry, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2002 at A15). 
 175. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 151.  Shortly thereafter Ashcroft testified to Con-
gress that the Justice Department’s mission had been redefined to focus on detecting and preventing 
terrorism rather than on prosecuting criminal activity.  See John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, For-
feiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act 
and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1086-87 (2002). 
 176. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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the legislature and hurriedly signed into law.177  A lengthy and complicated piece 
of legislation containing 158 separate provisions, the Act dramatically expands 
the government’s law enforcement and intelligence gathering powers, blurs the 
line between criminal and intelligence investigations, criminalizes political pro-
test, and further curtails immigrants’ rights.178 
In the Yasui case, the federal district court attempted to skirt the issue of the 
internment of U.S. citizens by declaring that Min Yasui had “forfeited” his citi-
zenship by working for the Japanese consulate.179  Apparently the government is 
now attempting to institutionalize this practice, for in January 2003 a draft of 
the Justice Department’s proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 
2003,”180 more commonly known as “PATRIOT II,” was leaked to the public.  If 
passed, it would expand the already impressive list of powers given law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies by the USA PATRIOT Act, by, among 
other things, allowing for the “expatriation” of U.S. citizens for becoming 
members of, or providing material support to, a group that is deemed a “terror-
ist organization . . . engaged in hostilities against the United States.”181  The 
terms “material support” and “terrorist organization” are defined very broadly, 
and “hostilities” is left undefined.182 
VII 
“FOREIGN . . . IN A DOMESTIC SENSE”:  
U.S. CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS 
While in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign country, since it was sub-
ject to the sovereignty of and was owned by the United States, it was foreign to the 
United States in a domestic sense, because the island had not been incorporated into 
the United States, but was merely appurtenant thereto as a possession. 
 
 177. The history of the bill is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162: 
@@@L&summ2=m&. 
 178. See generally CHANG, supra note 7; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 175; Jennifer C. Evans, 
Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002); 
Michael T. McCarthy, USA PATRIOT Act, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435 (2002). 
 179. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 180. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/ 
downloads/Story_01_020703_Doc_1.pdf (draft of Jan. 9, 2003).  The draft includes the proposed text of 
the legislation as well as a section-by-section analysis. 
 181. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, supra note 180, § 501. 
 182. The definition of “material support” for both “international terrorism” and “domestic terror-
ism” would also be expanded.  “Training” would extend to “instruction or teaching designed to impart 
a specific skill” and “providing personnel” would include providing an organization with “one or more 
individuals (including himself) to work in concert with it or under its direction or control.”  Domestic 
Security Enhancement Act of 2003, supra note 180, §402; Analysis p. 21.  Under the USA PATRIOT 
Act, “Engaging in terrorist activity” encompasses soliciting members or funds, and providing material 
support or “encouragement” to a “terrorist” organization, even if the activity is undertaken solely to 
support the lawful, humanitarian activities of the organization, and even if the associational activities 
would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment.  USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 176, §411(a); 
see also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 175, at 1098-99.  These organizations need not be on any offi-
cial list, but can simply be groups which are comprised of “two or more individuals, whether organized 
or not” engaging in certain activities, including the use or threat of violence.  USA PATRIOT Act, 
§411(a).  The activities are listed at 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2003). 
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Downes v. Bidwell (J. White, concurring) (1901)183 
In the fall of 2001 the United States waged war on Afghanistan, claiming 
that its ruling Taliban government was harboring Osama bin Laden and the al 
Qaeda network, believed to be responsible for the September 11 attacks.184  Af-
ter a massive bombing campaign, the Taliban was replaced with a government 
friendlier to U.S. interests.185  In the meantime, U.S. forces captured over 600 
men and boys of several dozen nationalities and transported them to the U.S. 
naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where most continue to be detained and 
interrogated more than three years later.186 
Two of those captured, John Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi, turned 
out to be U.S. citizens.  Lindh was immediately taken to Alexandria, Virginia, 
and charged with conspiring to kill Americans.  White House spokesman Ari 
Fleischer announced that “the great strength of America is [that] he will now 
have his day in court”187 and, in fact, Lindh soon appeared in a civilian criminal 
court.  Represented by counsel and supported by his family, he pled guilty to 
reduced charges of supplying services to the Taliban and carrying an explosive 
during the commission of a felony and received a twenty-year prison sentence.188 
Hamdi, on the other hand, was first taken to Guantánamo Bay where it was 
established that he was a U.S. citizen, born in Louisiana.  Rather than being 
transferred to a U.S. civilian court, as Lindh was, Hamdi was placed in a naval 
brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and held incommunicado for nearly three years.189  De-
spite the breadth of the government’s “anti-terrorist” powers, including the ex-
 
 183. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901). 
 184. See John Quigley, The Afghanistan War and Self-Defense, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 541 (2003); Jor-
dan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 533 (2002). 
 185. See Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Tech-
nology and Terror from World War I to Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 56-65 (2002); Michael P. 
Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on Nation Building in Afghanistan, 36 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 709 (2002); Laura A. Dickinson, Reluctant Nation Building: Promoting the Rule of 
Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 429 (2002). 
 186. See generally MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTÁNAMO: WHAT THE WORLD 
SHOULD KNOW (2004); Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Responds to a “Legal Black Hole,” 10 HUM. RTS. BR. 2 
(Spring 2003); Erin Chlopak, Dealing With the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Humanitarian and Hu-
man Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM. RTS. BR. 6 (Spring 2002). 
 187. Katherine Q. Seelye, Walker is Returned to U.S. and Will Be in Court Today, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
24, 2002, at A15.  See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). 
 188. See United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); Melysa H. Sperber, John 
Walker Lindh and Yaser Esam Hamdi: Closing the Loophole in International Humanitarian Law for 
American Nationals Captured Abroad While Fighting with Enemy Forces, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 
160-61 (2003); see generally Suzanne Kelly Babb, Fear and Loathing in America: Application of Treason 
Law in Times of National Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1271 (2003); 
James P. Fantetti, John Walker Lindh, Terrorist?  Or Merely A Citizen Exercising His Constitutional 
Freedom: The Limits of the Freedom of Association in the Aftermath of September Eleventh, 71 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1373 (2003). 
 189. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Donna R. Newman, The Jose Padilla Story, 48 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39 (2003/2004); Alejandra Rodriguez, Is The War on Terrorism Compromising 
Civil Liberties?  A Discussion of Hamdi and Padilla, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 379, 381 (2003); Sperber, su-
pra note 188, at 162.  See generally Iijima, Shooting, supra note 10. 
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panded use of preventive detention and the death penalty,190 the government 
chose to label Hamdi an “enemy combatant,” denying him access to counsel 
and to the courts.191  A petition for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf by his 
father alleging, among other things, that he was being held in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.192  In response, the government filed a dec-
laration by Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense, 
(the “Mobbs Declaration”), which asserted that Hamdi “traveled to Afghani-
stan” in July or August 2001, was “affiliated with a Taliban military unit and re-
ceived weapons training,” remained with the unit after September 11, and was 
captured by Northern Alliance forces to whom he surrendered a Kalashnikov 
assault rifle.193  According to the Mobbs Declaration, “individuals associated 
with” al Qaeda and the Taliban “were and continue to be enemy combatants.”194 
The District Court criticized the Mobbs Declaration for its “generic and 
hearsay nature,” calling it “little more than the government’s ‘say-so,’” found 
that the affidavit fell “far short” of supporting Hamdi’s detention, and ordered 
the government to turn over numerous documents for in camera review.195  The 
Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that the government was entitled to “great def-
erence” in matters of “foreign policy, national security, or military affairs.”196  In 
what Iijima describes as “a stunning exercise of circular reasoning,”197 the court 
concluded that no further investigation of the accuracy of the Mobbs Declara-
tion was required, as the “factual averments in the affidavit, if accurate, are suf-
ficient to confirm that Hamdi’s detention conforms with a legitimate exercise of 
the war powers given the executive by [the Constitution].”198 
 
 190. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 191. U.S. officials have used this undefined term to take advantage of the Geneva Conventions’ 
provision distinguishing between the treatment of enemy soldiers, who cannot be punished simply for 
engaging in combat, and “unlawful” combatants.  At the same time, however, they have failed to ac-
knowledge as binding the Conventions’ requirements that all detainees be presumed prisoners of war 
until an individual hearing has determined otherwise and that all detainees, regardless of status, be af-
forded minimal protections.  See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 7, 39-46; see 
generally Nickolas A. Kacprowski, Stacking the Deck Against Suspected Terrorists: The Dwindling Pro-
cedural Limits on the Government’s Power to Indefinitely Detain United States Citizens as Enemy Com-
batants, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651 (2003); Susan M. Burns, Access to Counsel for “Enemy Combat-
ant” Citizens in Military Detention: A Statutory or Constitutional Right?  Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 
564 (2002), 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 599 (2004); Charles I. Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule by Law; The Detention 
of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 225 (2003); Amanda Schaffer, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Ter-
rorists: An In-Depth Analysis of the Government’s Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of 
Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465 (2003). 
 192. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2636. 
 193. Id. at 2637 (quoting the Mobbs Declaration). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id., citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 196. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 197. Iijima, Shooting, supra note 10 at 122. 
 198. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d at 473.  For an in-depth analysis of this case and of Padilla’s, see 
generally Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 1397 (2004). 
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In June 2004 the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit.199  In an opin-
ion written by Justice O’Connor for a four-justice plurality, the Court con-
cluded that under the “all necessary and appropriate force” clause of Congress’ 
Authorization for Use of Military Force,200 Hamdi could be detained as an “en-
emy combatant,” thus avoiding Hamdi’s contention that his detention was for-
bidden by Congress’ 1971 repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, a re-
peal explicitly based on concerns about internments such as that of the 
Japanese Americans.201  It held, however, that “a citizen-detainee seeking to 
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Govern-
ment’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”202  The Court did not 
require that the “neutral decisionmaker” be a federal court, or that constitu-
tional protections normally pertaining to criminal proceedings be extended to 
such “citizen-detainees”: 
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence 
from the Government in such a proceeding.  Likewise, the Constitution would not be 
offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that pre-
sumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were pro-
vided.203 
Rather than provide Hamdi with this very minimal due process, the gov-
ernment chose to release him.  As reported by the New York Times “Yaser E. 
Hamdi, an American citizen captured in Afghanistan and once deemed so dan-
gerous that the American military held him incommunicado for more than two 
years as an enemy combatant, will be freed and allowed to return to Saudi Ara-
bia in the next few days, officials said.”204  On its face a surprising move or, as 
the Times put it, a “striking reversal in a hotly debated test case,”205 it is in many 
respects quite consistent with the government’s decision to arbitrarily declare 
certain Japanese Americans “loyal” and release them on the basis of a ques-
tionnaire after it had interned them, without a hearing, on the theory that their 
ancestry rendered them inherently “disloyal.”206  The decision to release Hamdi 
is also less than surprising when considered in the context of cases in which, well 
 
 199. 124 S. Ct. at 2649. 
 200. 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 2001) (authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks [of September 11]” or “harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons”). 
 201. 124 S. Ct. at 2639, citing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), passed as part of a bill to repeal the Emergency 
Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811 et seq., and related congressional testimony found at H.R. Rep. 
No. 92-116 (1971); 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N 1435, 1438. 
 202. 124 S. Ct. at 2648. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Eric Lichtblau, U.S. to Free “Enemy Combatant,” Bowing to Supreme Court Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, A1.  Contrary to the implications of the headline the Court did not order Hamdi 
freed. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
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before September 11, the government attempted to deport politically “undesir-
able” Muslims and Arabs on the basis of secret evidence. 
Georgetown law professor David Cole and James Dempsey, former assis-
tant counsel to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitution 
Rights, report that in November 1986 
the Justice Department was considering internally a document entitled “Alien Terror-
ists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan.”  The document was circulated by the 
Alien Border Control Committee, a secret inter-agency task force organized in 1986 to 
develop, among other things, plans for the “expulsion from the United States of alien 
activists who are not in conformity with their immigration status.”  The “contingency 
plan” proposed building a detention camp in a remote area of Louisiana to hold “alien 
undesirables” pending deportation.  It . . . identified certain countries, all Arab, as be-
ing likely origins of terrorist aliens. . . . The Committee was specifically looking for 
ways to use secret evidence [when criminal prosecution was not practicable].207 
In the late 1980s and 1990s the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) began attempting, on the basis of secret evidence, to deport Arab immi-
grants who had been targeted for their lawful political activities.  Until the Su-
preme Court’s 1999 holding in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee208 that the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act209 stripped the courts of much of their power to review deportation 
cases, lower federal courts found this practice to be unconstitutional in a num-
ber of cases.210  Thus, for example, in Rafeedie v. INS211 the government had 
claimed that revealing its reasons for deporting Fouad Rafeedie would be 
“prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security of the United States.”212  
The D.C. Circuit Court responded: “Rafeedie—just like Joseph K. in The 
Trial—can prevail . . . only if he can rebut the undisclosed evidence against him, 
i.e., prove that he is not a terrorist regardless of what might be implied by the 
Government’s confidential information.  It is difficult to imagine how even 
someone innocent of all wrongdoing could meet such a burden.”213  It rejected 
the INS’s use of secret evidence and on remand the District Court, weighing 
Rafeedie’s due process rights against the government’s national security con-
cerns, ordered him released.214 
Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian father of four U.S. citizen children, spent more 
than three and a half years in prison, most of it in solitary confinement as the 
 
 207. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 39. 
 208. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); see also Maryam 
Kamali Miyamoto, The First Amendment after Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit-
tee: A Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (2000). 
 209. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).  See generally Lisa J. Laplante, Expedited Re-
moval at U.S. Borders: A World Without a Constitution, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 213 (1999); 
Clarence E. Zachery, Jr., The Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures: Removing the Enemy Among Us or 
Becoming the Enemy from Within?, 9 GEO. IMMIG. L. J. 291 (1995); Johnson, supra note 172. 
 210. See generally Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideo-
logical Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 51(1999). 
 211. Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989); remanded to 795 F. Supp. 13 (D. D.C. 1992). 
 212. Rafeedie v. INS, 688 F. Supp. 729, 734-35 (D. D.C. 1992). 
 213. 880 F.2d at 516. 
 214. 795 F. Supp. at 13. 
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INS attempted to deport him on the basis of secret evidence.  For the first year, 
the government would not even provide Ahmed’s lawyer with a summary of the 
evidence against him; eventually they provided a one-line summary baldly as-
serting that it had evidence “concerning respondent’s association with a known 
terrorist organization,” but refused to identify the organization.  As it turned 
out, Ahmed had come to the FBI’s attention when he worked as a court-
appointed paralegal and translator for the defense team of Sheik Abdel Rah-
man, who was charged with seditious conspiracy.  The FBI and INS tried to get 
Ahmed to inform on the cleric and threatened to deport him and his family if he 
did not cooperate.  Ahmed refused and the INS made good on its threat.  Even 
though the immigration judge had “no doubt” that Ahmed would be impris-
oned and likely tortured if he returned to Egypt and that he was thus eligible 
for political asylum, Ahmed was released only after the government was even-
tually forced to reveal its evidence, which consisted only of his “associations.”215 
According to Cole and Dempsey, from 1996 through 2000 the government 
“sought to use secret evidence to detain and deport about two dozen immi-
grants, almost all of them Muslims accused of vague associations with terrorist 
groups.  Over time, case by case, the government’s evidence was revealed to be 
worthless, its legal theories were largely rejected, and virtually all of the accused 
aliens were released.”216  Cole, who represented thirteen individuals in secret 
evidence deportation cases, testified before a subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee in February 2000 that “[at] one time, the INS claimed that all 
13 posed a direct threat to the security of the nation, and that the evidence to 
support that assertion could not be revealed—in many instances could not even 
be summarized—without jeopardizing national security.  Yet in none of these 
cases did the INS’s secret evidence [once revealed] even allege, much less 
prove, that the aliens had engaged in or supported any criminal, much less ter-
rorist, activity.”217 
In light of this consistent history of attempts to deport politically undesir-
able aliens on the basis of secret evidence, the government’s desire to deport 
 
 215. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 129-31; see also Akram, supra note 210, at 76. 
 216. COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 127.  In one particularly strange case, six Iraqi Kurds 
who participated in a failed CIA-backed attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein were brought to the 
U.S. in 1997 by government officials.  When they arrived, the INS tried to exclude them on the basis of 
secret evidence that, initially, it would not reveal even to their lawyer, former CIA director James 
Woolsey.  After several years in detention, five of them entered into a settlement agreement under 
which they are living in Nebraska under conditions resembling house arrest while they look for third 
countries which will accept them.  See Andrew Cockburn, The Radicalization of James Woolsey, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., July 23, 2000, 26, 29 (quoting Woolsey’s characterization of the evidence, when he was 
finally allowed to see it, as “a joke”); see also COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 166, at 137-39; Akram, su-
pra note 210, at 78. 
 217. Statement of Professor David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center, On the Use of Secret 
Evidence in Immigration Proceedings and H.R. 2121, Before the House Judiciary Committee, 
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 10 February 2000, available at http://www.house.gov/ 
judiciary/cole0210.htm; see also Dave Martella, Defending the Land of the Free and the Home of the 
Fearful: The Use of Classified Information to Deport Suspected Terrorists, 7 AM. UNIV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 951 (1992). 
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Hamdi, rather than participate in even a pro forma hearing, is not particularly 
surprising.  However, in Hamdi’s case, there was a complication, for, although 
perceived as a “politically undesirable alien,” he is—or was—a U.S. citizen.  
Professor Leti Volpp describes the process at work in this and similar situations: 
In the American imagination, those who appear “Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim” 
may be theoretically entitled to formal rights, but they do not stand in for or represent 
the nation.  Instead, they are interpellated as antithetical to the citizen’s sense of iden-
tity.  Citizenship in the form of legal status does not guarantee that they will be consti-
tutive of the American body politic.  In fact, quite the opposite:  The consolidation of 
American identity takes place against them.218 
In Hamdi’s case his formal rights as a citizen were superseded by his identity as 
“antithetical” to that of a real American and the constitutional rights to which 
he should have been entitled voided by requiring, in return for his release, that 
he not only agree to deportation to Saudi Arabia, where he had grown up, but 
that he renounce his U.S. citizenship.219 
On its face, there is little to distinguish John Walker Lindh’s case from that 
of Yaser Hamdi.  Both were U.S.-born citizens, allegedly captured fighting with 
the Taliban.  Yet Lindh, a European American, received an open trial in a civil-
ian criminal court, with no diminishment of his constitutional rights, and 
Hamdi, of Middle Eastern descent, was denied all rights.  One imagines that, 
much like the Tule Lake renunciants, his only choice appeared to be indefinite 
arbitrary detention or the renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.  Using the 
framework articulated by Neil Gotanda,220 when the “citizen/alien” distinction 
was directly confronted with the “American/‘foreign’” dichotomy, perceived 
foreignness trumped citizenship.221 
The question now becomes, what will happen to Jose Padilla?  Padilla, who 
is of Puerto Rican descent, was born in Brooklyn and thus, like Lindh and 
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen by birth.  But, unlike either Lindh or Hamdi, he was not 
captured in Afghanistan or any other arena of combat, but was arrested in May 
2002 at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport on a material witness warrant.222  Two days 
before a scheduled court hearing, he was declared an enemy combatant and or-
dered into military custody, where he remains.223 
Accompanying the order classifying Padilla as an “enemy combatant” was a 
declaration by Michael Mobbs stating that Padilla had contacted al Qaeda offi-
cials and proposed stealing radioactive material and detonating a “radiological 
 
 218. Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2002). 
 219. Lichtblau, supra note 204 (noting that “the agreement also bars him from leaving Saudi Arabia 
for a time and requires him to report possible terrorist activity”). 
 220. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 221. For discussions of citizenship in this context, see generally Volpp, supra note 218; Karen Engle, 
Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism), 75 COLO. L. REV. 
59 (2004); Jaykant M. Patidar, Citizenship and the Treatment of American Citizen Terrorists in the 
United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 805 (2004). 
 222. See Iijima, Shooting, supra note 10, at 134-38. 
 223. See Newman, supra note 189, at 40. 
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dispersal device” in the U.S.224  Padilla’s lawyer, who had not been allowed to 
meet with him, filed a petition for habeas corpus on his behalf in the Southern 
District of New York, which held that the President did have the authority to 
designate an American citizen captured on American soil as an enemy combat-
ant, but also that Padilla had to be able to consult with counsel and challenge 
the facts upon which the government based its designation.225  On appeal the 
Second Circuit held that “while Congress—otherwise acting consistently with 
the Constitution—may have the power to authorize the detention of United 
States citizens under the circumstances of Padilla’s case,” the President acting 
alone does not have the power “to detain as an enemy combatant an American 
citizen seized on American soil outside a zone of combat.”226 
In the spring of 2004 the Supreme Court heard Padilla’s case but failed to 
reach the merits, holding that the case had been filed in the wrong jurisdiction, 
thereby delaying its final resolution.227  However, since the Court has held that 
not only Yaser Hamdi but also the noncitizen detainees at Guantánamo Bay 
have a right to some kind of hearing,228 it is likely to hold that Padilla, as a U.S. 
citizen arrested on U.S. soil, has at least as much right to due process as a per-
son captured in combat.  Perhaps it will agree with the Second Circuit and hold 
that Padilla cannot be held as an enemy combatant in the absence of specific 
congressional authorization.  It could even overturn the purportedly discredited 
precedent of Korematsu by holding that U.S. citizens cannot be detained indefi-
nitely on vague claims of “military necessity,” but must be charged and tried in 
accordance with the Constitution. 
Regardless of the position ultimately taken by the Court, the executive 
branch’s treatment of Padilla to date raises significant issues about the nature of 
citizenship and its relationship to the Constitution.  Born in Brooklyn, Padilla is 
a U.S. citizen by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, just as Hamdi and all of 
the Nisei interned in World War II were.  Yet Padilla is both an internal Other 
by virtue of his race and ethnicity, and perceived as an external Other as a re-
sult of his conversion to Islam and the political associations attributed to him.  
As such, he  is perhaps best described, as the Nisei were, as a “non-alien”—a 
citizen without the protections that status is thought to entail. 
 
 224. Padilla ex rel Newman v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  It has become 
increasingly clear that Padilla’s connection to al Qaeda was tenuous at best and that, according to U.S. 
intelligence officials, the plot was “blown out of proportion.”  See Christopher Newton, Officials 
Downplay Terror Suspect, AP Online, Aug. 13, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25139054; Michael Isikoff, 
And Justice for All: John Ashcroft Crowed at the Arrest of Alleged “Dirty Bomber” Jose Padilla.  But 
Do the Feds Have a Case?  NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 2002, 32; Iijima, Shooting, supra note 10, at 135. 
 225. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572, 600.  The proposed standard of review, however, was only whether there 
was “some evidence to support [the President’s] conclusion that Padilla was . . . engaged in a mission 
against the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the United States is at war, and . . . whether 
that evidence has not been entirely mooted by subsequent events.” Id. at 601. 
 226. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 at 715, 698 (2003). 
 227. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).  The Court held that the New York federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction since Padilla is being held in South Carolina. 
 228. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
